An Efficient $(n-t)$-out-of-n Threshold Ring Signature Scheme

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Abstract

In this paper, we propose an efficient $(n-t)$-out-of-n threshold ring signature scheme which is efficient when t is small compared with n. Our scheme has a kind of dual structure of the Bresson–Stern–Szydlo threshold ring signature scheme [2], which is infeasible when t is small compared with n. In particular, we modify the trap-door one-way permutations in the ring signature scheme, and use a combinatorial notion called *fair partition*. Our scheme is provably secure in the random oracle model.

keywords: ring signature, threshold signature

1 Introduction

Anonymity is required to ensure that information about the user is not revealed in some multi-user cryptographic applications. The notion of group signature was introduced by Chaum and van Heijst [3], allows a registered member of a predefined group to produce anonymous signatures on behalf of the group. However, this anonymity can be revoked by an authority if necessary. The distinct but related concept of ring signature has been formalized by Rivest, Shamir, and Tauman [4]. This concept is of particular interest when the members do not agree to cooperate since the scheme requires neither a group manager, nor a setup procedure, nor the action of a non-signing member.

A ring signature specifies a set of possible signers and a proof that is intended to convince any verifier that the author of the signature belongs to this set, while hiding her identity. The scheme is said to be signer ambiguous in the sense that the verifier cannot tell which user in this set actually produces the signature.

In this paper, we consider the case that t users want to sign a message, so that any verifier will be convinced that at least t users among a select group. Simply constructing t ring signatures clearly does not prove that the message has been signed by different t signers. A threshold ring signature scheme proves that at least t users among a certain group have actually collaborated to construct the signature in anonymous way.

Assume that in order to create a certain signature at least t out of the n parties need to combine their knowledge. Combining the shares must not reveal the actual secret key. The correctness of the signature would be verifiable using the public keys. Any t out of the n parties can perform some cryptographic operation jointly, whereas it is infeasible for at most $t-1$ parties to do so.

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Recently, Bresson, Stern, and Szydlo [2] proposed an efficient scheme for threshold ring signature, which is provably secure in the random oracle model. In particular, their construction is very efficient when threshold t is small. However, it is very inefficient when t is $\omega(\log n)$, and is infeasible when $t > n/2$ since the anonymity property does not hold in this case. In their scheme, there is the solution that the verifier adds the dummy members to the n ring members in a setup procedure in order to $t < n'/2$, however, this solution losses the property of ring signature that has no setup procedure.

Consider that a majority of members in some section of a company wishes to claim something for a director of the company. The previous scheme does not work for this simple case.

In this paper, we propose a solution for this case, i.e., a threshold ring signature scheme which is efficient when threshold t is large compared with n, i.e. $t = n - k$ (k is small compared with n). Our scheme has a kind of dual structure of the Bresson–Stern–Szydlo threshold ring signature scheme. They used a structure of so-called *super-ring*, which has standard 1-out-of-n ring signatures as nodes. In our scheme, we use a set of ring signatures as a $(n-t)$-out-of-n signature. We still employ a simple structure of ring (not super-ring), and modify the trap-door one-way permutations for it.

2 Preliminaries

In this paper, we follow the formalization proposed by Rivest, Shamir, and Tauman [4]. They proposed the notion of ring signature, which allows a member of an ad-hoc collection of users S to prove that a message is authenticated by a member of S without revealing which member actually produced the signature.

We assume that each user has received a public key PK_k, for which the corresponding secret key is denoted by SK_k. A ring signature scheme consists of the following algorithms.

- **Ring-sign**: A probabilistic algorithm outputs a ring signature σ for the message m, with input a message m, the public keys $PK_1, \ldots, PK_r$ of the r ring members, together with the secret key SK_s of a signer.
- **Ring-verify**: A deterministic algorithm outputs either "`ACCEPT`" or "`REJECT`" with input (m, σ) (where σ includes the public key of all the possible signers).

A ring signature scheme must satisfy the correctness (i.e. a correct ring signature should be accepted as valid with overwhelming probability) and unforgeability (i.e. it must be infeasible for any non-ring member to generate a valid ring signature, except with negligible probability). We also require anonymity that nobody should be able to guess the actual signer's identity with probability greater than $1/n + \epsilon$, where n is the number of the ring members, and ϵ is negligible.

2.1 Ring Signature Schemes by Bresson, Stern, and Szydlo [2]

In this paper, we propose an $(n-t)$-out-of-n ring signature scheme, where t is small compared with n. In our scheme, we use a kind of dual structure of the Bresson–Stern–Szydlo threshold ring signature scheme. They also proposed a modification of the original Rivest–Shamir–Tauman ring signature scheme and they use it as a building block of their threshold ring signature scheme.

In this section, we briefly review this modification proposed by Bresson, Stern, and Szydlo [2], based on the random oracle model, while the original Rivest–Shamir-Tauman scheme uses the ideal cipher model.

We denote by ℓ, ℓ_b, ℓ_0 three security parameters. We consider a hash function $\mathcal{H}$ that maps arbitrary strings on ℓ_b-bit strings. We assume that each user P_i uses a regular signature scheme built on a trapdoor one-way permutation f_i on $\mathbb{Z}_{n_i}^*$: $f_i(x) = x^{e_i} \bmod n_i$ where $|n_i| = \ell_b < \ell$.

$$g_i(x) = \begin{cases} q_i n_i + f_i(r_i) & \text{if } (q_i+1)n_i \le 2^\ell \\ x & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \tag{1}$$

where $x = q_i n_i + r_i$, and $0 \le r_i < n_i$.

Generating a ring signature

Given the message m to be signed, her secret key SK_s, and the sequence of public keys $PK_1, PK_2, \ldots, PK_r$ of all the ring members, the signer computes a ring signature as follows.

1. **Choose a random seed:** The signer picks a random seed σ in $\{0,1\}^{\ell_b}$,and computes

$$v_{s+1} = \mathcal{H}(m, \sigma).$$

2. **Pick random x_i's:** The signer picks random x_i for all the other ring members $1 \le i \le r$, $i \ne s$ uniformly and independently from $\{0,1\}^{\ell_b}$, and computes for $i = s+1, s+2, \ldots, n, 1, 2, \ldots, s-1$,

$$v_{i+1} = \mathcal{H}(m, v_i \oplus g_i(x_i)).$$

   where

$$g_i(x) = \begin{cases} q_i n_i + f_i(r_i) & \text{if } (q_i+1)n_i \le 2^\ell \\ x & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

   with $x = q_i n_i + r_i$ and $0 \le r_i < n_i$.

3. **Solve for x_s:** The signer solves the following equation for x_s by using her knowledge of trap-door permutation:

$$\sigma = v_s \oplus g_s(x_s).$$

4. **Output the signature:** The signer chooses at random an index $i_0 \in \{1, 2, \ldots, r\}$, then the signature on the message m is defined as the $(2r+2)$-tuple:

$$(PK_1, PK_2, \ldots, PK_r; i_0; v_{i_0}; x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_r).$$

Verifying a ring signature

A verifier can verify an alleged signature

$$(PK_1, PK_2, \ldots, PK_r; i_0; v_{i_0}; x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_r)$$

on the message m as follows.

1. **Apply the trapdoor permutations:** For $i = i_0 + 1, i_0 + 2, \ldots, n, 1, 2, \ldots, i_0 - 1$, the verifier computes

$$v_i = \mathcal{H}(m, v_{i-1} \oplus g_{i-1}(x_{i-1})).$$

2. **Verify the equation:** The verifier checks that the v_i's satisfy the equation:

$$v_{i_0} = \mathcal{H}(m, v_{i_0-1} \oplus g_{i_0-1}(x_{i_0-1})).$$

   If this equation is satisfied, the verifier outputs "`ACCEPT`", otherwise "`REJECT`".

2.2 Formulation of Threshold Ring Signature

In [2], Bresson, Stern, and Szydlo introduced the definition and the security requirements for threshold ring signature. Here, we briefly review them:

A t-out-of-n threshold ring signature scheme consists of the following algorithms:

- **T-ring-sign:** A probabilistic algorithm outputs a t-out-of-n threshold ring signature σ on the message m (where σ includes the value of t as well as the n public keys of all ring members), with input a message m, the public keys $PK_1, \ldots, PK_n$ of the n ring members, together with the t secret keys $\mathrm{SK}_{i_1}, \ldots, SK_{i_t}$ of t signers.
- **T-ring-verify:** A deterministic algorithm outputs either "`ACCEPT`" or "`REJECT`" with input (m, σ).

The adversary $\mathcal{A}$ is given the public keys $PK_1, \ldots, PK_n$ of the n ring members, and can access to the hash function $\mathcal{H}$. Also, $\mathcal{A}$ is given access to a signing oracle. We define that t-forger against a threshold ring signature is a probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine $\mathcal{A}$, that can sign a message on behalf of t users, with up to $t-1$ corrupted users, under the adaptive chosen message attack.

Definition 1 *We say a t-out-of-n threshold ring signature scheme is t-CMA-secure if no t-forger $\mathcal{A}$ can succeed to forge a signature with non-negligible probability.*

We require the signature to have anonymity (i.e. nobody should be able to guess the actual signer's identity) and unforgeability (i.e. the scheme is t-CMA-secure).

2.3 Fair Partitions and the Previous Threshold Ring Signature Scheme

In this paper, we propose an $(n-t)$-out-of-n ring signature scheme, where t is small compared with n. In our scheme, we use a kind of dual structure of the Bresson–Stern–Szydlo threshold ring signature scheme, and employ a combinatorial notion called *fair partition* that is used in the Bresson–Stern–Szydlo threshold ring signature scheme. Here, we briefly review its definition and (n,t)-complete partitioning systems introduced in [2] (see also [1]).

Let $\pi = (\pi^1, \cdots, \pi^t)$ a partition of $[1,n]$ in t subsets and $I = \{i_1, \cdots, i_t\}$ a set of t indices in $[1,n]$. If all integers in I belongs to t different subsets, we say that π is a *fair partition for I*.

Definition 2 *Let $\pi = (\pi^1, \cdots, \pi^t)$ a partition of $[1,n]$ in t subsets and $I = \{i_1, \cdots, i_t\}$ a set of t indices in $[1,n]$. We say that π is a **fair partition** for I if for all $j \in [1,t]$,*

$$\#(I \cap \pi^j) = 1.$$

Here, $\#(A)$ denotes the number of elements of A.

To ensure anonymity, we need to provide a set Π of partitions such that there exists a fair partition for any set I of t indices in $[1,n]$.

Definition 3 *Let $t < n$. We say that a set of Π of partitions of $[1,n]$ is an (n,t)-**complete partitioning system** if for any set I of cardinality t, there exists a fair partition in Π for I.*

A perfect hash function for a set I is a mapping $h : [1,n] \to [1,t]$ which is 1-1 on I. We say H is an (n,t)-family of perfect hash functions if for any I of size t, there exists $h \in H$ which is perfect on I. It is clear that defining a partition in t sub-groups for each member of an (n,t)-family makes an

(n,t)-complete partitioning system. In [1], Alon, Yuster, and Zwick has been proved that there exists an (n,t)-family of perfect hash function which has size of $2^{O(t)}\log n$. Moreover each of these functions is efficiently computable.

Here, we briefly describe the idea of the threshold ring signature scheme proposed by Bresson, Stern, and Szydlo [2]. Consider a ring of n members, and among them t users who want to sign for a message. Let $I=\{i_1,\ldots,i_t\}$ a set of t indices in $[1,n]$ such that $P_{i_1},\ldots,P_{i_t}$ are signers. The idea is to split the group into t disjoint sub-groups regard to a fair partition for I, and to show that each of these sub-groups contains one signer by producing sub-rings. However doing so may compromise perfect anonymity since such split restricts the anonymity of each user to a sub-ring. To ensure anonymity, their scheme needs to split the group regard to an (n,t)-complete partitioning system for which any t users are in different sub-rings. Then all of these splits are used as nodes in a super-ring. The super-ring proves that at least one split has been solved.

The size of the signature in this scheme is $\mathcal{O}(\ell 2^t n\log n)$, the cost is t inversions of the signers' one-way functions and $\mathcal{O}(2^t n\log n)$ computations in the easy direction.

It should be pointed out that when $t>n/2$, there exist some partitions which consist only one element in a fair partition for I. Therefore, this scheme cannot be used for such t since the anonymity property does not hold.

3 Our Scheme

In this section, we propose an efficient $(n-t)$-out-of-n threshold ring signature scheme where the number of non-signer t is small compared with the number of ring members n. Let $\Pi_n^{t+1}=\{\pi_1,\ldots,\pi_p\}$ $(p=2^{t+1}\log n)$ to be an $(n,t+1)$-complete partitioning system.

We consider a ring of n members, and among them $n-t$ users who want to sign for a message. Our scheme is based on the idea that is to prove at most t members are non-signers among n ring members.

We split the group into $t+1$ disjoint sub-groups, and show that there is at least one sub-group which consists of only signers. In order to do this, we employ a notion of fair partitions and modified trapdoor one-way permutations with secret keys of multiple signers. Since if we use only one such split then it restricts the anonymity of each user to a sub-group, our scheme needs to split the group regard to an $(n,t+1)$-complete partitioning system in many times for which any $t+1$ members are in distinct sub-groups by constructing ring signatures for partitions of Π_n^{t+1}. The scheme has a kind of dual structure of the Bresson–Stern–Szydlo threshold ring signature scheme, however this still employ a simple structure of ring.

For example, in the case of $t=2$ (i.e. making an $(n-2)$-out-of-n threshold ring signature), let $\pi_i=\{\pi_i^1,\pi_i^2,\pi_i^3\}\in\Pi_n^3$ be a partition of $[1,n]$ and P_a and P_b are non-signers, where $a,b\in[1,n]$. If P_a and P_b belongs to π_i^1 and π_i^2 respectively, the all members of π_i^3 are signers. Therefore, since the signer knows the trapdoors that are the secret keys of the members belongs to π_i^3, he is able to produce a valid threshold ring signature. However, since if there are three non-signers P_a, P_b, and P_c then there is at least one partition such that they belong to distinct partitions, the signer cannot make a valid 3-out-of-n threshold ring signature for such partition. Here, the anonymity of each user is restricted to each partition. To ensure anonymity, we need $\Pi_n^3=\{\pi_1,\ldots,\pi_p\}$ that is an $(n,3)$-complete partitioning system, and prove that for all $i\in[1,p]$, the threshold ring signature for π_i is valid.

3.1 Description

We describe formally our $(n-t)$-out-of-n ring signature scheme where t is small.

We denote by ℓ a security parameter. We denote an $(n, t+1)$-complete partitioning system $\Pi_n^{t+1} = \{\pi_1, \ldots, \pi_p\}$ where $p = 2^{t+1} \log n$, and each partition $\pi_i = (\pi_i^1, \ldots, \pi_i^{t+1})$, where each π_i^j is a set of indices. Let $\{P_1, \ldots, P_n\}$ be a set of n ring members for a message m. For each i, j, we denote by q_i^j the number of elements of π_i^j, and by Q the maximum number of q_i^j. Let $\pi_i^j = \{p_i^{j,1}, \ldots, p_i^{j,q_i^j}\}$.

We assume that for all integer n and $t \leq n$, an $(n, t+1)$-complete partitioning system is publicly available, and that each user P_i uses a regular signature scheme built on a trapdoor one-way permutation g_i over $\{0,1\}^\ell$. We say π_i^j is *legal* if for all $k \in \pi_i^j$, P_k is a signer.

We consider that a hash function $\mathcal{H}$ that maps $(Q \times \ell)$-bit strings. For each partition π_i^j, we define a trapdoor one-way permutation G_i^j:

If $q_i^j = Q$, then let $S_i^j = \pi_i^j$, else let $S_i^j = \{\pi_i^j \cup \{p_i^{j,q_i^j+1}, p_i^{j,q_i^j+2}, \ldots, p_i^{j,Q}\}\}$, where $p_i^{j,q_i^j+1} = p_i^{j,q_i^j+2} = \ldots = p_i^{j,Q} = p_i^{j,q_i^j}$.

$$G_i^j(x_1, \ldots, x_Q) = g_{p_i^{j,1}}(x_1) || \cdots || g_{p_i^{j,Q}}(x_Q).$$

Thus, each G_i^j has a Q-tuple of ℓ-bit strings as input and outputs a $(Q \times \ell)$-bit string, since each $g_{p_i^{j,k}}$ $(k = 1, 2, \ldots, Q)$ is a trapdoor one-way permutation of $P_{p_i^{j,k}}$ over $\{0,1\}^\ell$. The trapdoor of G_i^j is a set of all $g_{p_i^{j,k}}$'s trapdoors. It is clearly that G_i^j is a trapdoor one-way permutation since if one can invert G_i^j, then he do invert all $g_i^{j,k}$'s. For example, we assume that each $g_{p_i^{j,k}}$ is an extended RSA permutation (1) in Section 2.1, and let $(n_{p_i^{j,k}}, e_{p_i^{j,k}})$ to be the public key of $P_{p_i^{j,k}}$ and $d_{p_i^{j,k}}$ to be the secret key of $P_{p_i^{j,k}}$. Then, the trapdoor of G_i^j is $(d_{p_i^{j,1}}, \ldots, d_{p_i^{j,Q}})$.

Signing algorithm.

The signer executes the following steps for each π_i $(i = 1, 2, \ldots, p)$. Here, we assume that S_i^j is legal.

- **Choose random seeds:** The signer chooses random seeds $s^1, \ldots, s^Q \in \{0,1\}^\ell$ randomly and computes
$$v_{j+1} = \mathcal{H}(m, s^1, \ldots, s^Q).$$
- **Pick random x's:** For each $k = j+1, \ldots, t+1, 1, 2, \ldots, j-1$, the signer chooses $x_k^1, \ldots, x_k^Q \in \{0,1\}^\ell$ at random, and computes
$$v_{k+1} = \mathcal{H}(m, v_k \oplus G_i^k(x_k^1, \ldots, x_k^Q)).$$
- **Invert the legal S_i^j's trapdoor permutation:** The signer uses his knowledge of trapdoors of each $g_{p_i^{j,k}}$ in order to invert G_i^j to obtain $x_j^1, \ldots, x_j^Q$ such that $v_{j+1} = \mathcal{H}(m, v_j \oplus G_i^j(x_j^1, \ldots, x_j^Q))$.
- **Output the signature for π_i:** The signer chooses at random an index $i_0 \in \{1, 2, \ldots, t+1\}$, then the signature on the message m for π_i is defined as the $(2(t+1)Q+2)$-tuple:
$$\sigma_i = (PK_{p_i}^{1,1}, \ldots, PK_{p_i^{1,Q}}, PK_{p_i^{2,1}}, \ldots, PK_{p_i^{t+1,Q}}; i_0; v_{i_0}; x_1^1, \ldots, x_1^Q, x_2^1, \ldots, x_{t+1}^Q).$$

Thus, the signature on the message m is defined to be the p-tuple:

$$\sigma = (\sigma_1, \ldots, \sigma_p).$$

Verifying algorithm.



Figure 1: The ring signature for the partition π_i. Let Q to be a maximum number of the elements of each partition of an $(n, t+1)$-complete partitioning systems. Here, $\mathcal{H}$ is a hash function such that outputs $(Q \times \ell)$-bit string with input message m and XOR between $(Q \times \ell)$-bit string v_j and $G_i^j(x_j^1, \ldots, x_j^Q)$, where each x_j^k is ℓ-bit string. If π_i^3 is legal (i.e. consists of signers), the signer starts from a seed v_4 and computes v_3. Finally he solve the equation $v_4 = \mathcal{H}(m, v_3 \oplus G_i^3(x_3^1, \ldots, x_3^Q))$ by using the trapdoors. The signer makes for all i in $[1, t+1]$. The equation is verified in a straightforward way, starting at any given index.

The verifier can verify each σ_i $(i = 1, 2, \ldots, p)$ on the message m as follows.

- **Apply the trapdoor permutations:** For $k = i_0+1, i_0+2, \ldots, t+1, 1, 2, \ldots, i_0-1$, the verifier computes
$$v_k = \mathcal{H}(m, v_{k-1} \oplus G_i^j(x_k^1, \ldots, x_k^Q)),$$
and checks the equation:
$$v_{i_0} = \mathcal{H}(m, v_{i_0-1} \oplus G_i^j(x_{i_0-1}^1, \ldots, x_{i_0-1}^Q)).$$
If this equation is satisfied, then σ_i is "`TRUE`", otherwise "`FALSE`".

If for all $k = 1, 2, \ldots, p$, then σ_i is `TRUE`, then the verifier outputs "`ACCEPT`", otherwise "`REJECT`".

3.2 Security Analysis

We prove that the above scheme has the required property of threshold ring signature.

- **Completeness.** If there are at least $n - t$ signers among n ring members then there is at least one legal sub-group for each π_i. Therefore, it is straightforward that $n - t$ members are able to produce $p = 2^{t+1} \log n$ signatures for all partitions which are accepted as `TRUE` on behalf of $n - t$ signers.

- **Unforgeability.** We have to prove that a correct signature is necessarily produced by at least the claimed number of signers. We consider an adversary $\mathcal{A}$ that can mount an adaptive chosen

message attack, and is able to succeed with probability $\mathtt{Succ}^{\mathcal{H},sign}_{forge,\mathcal{A}}(\ell)$. We construct from it an adversary $\mathcal{B}$ against the one-wayness of the extended RSA function (1) in Section 2.1.

We show that in the random oracle model, if there exists a forging algorithm $\mathcal{A}$ which can generate a new $(n-t)$-out-of-n ring signature for a message with $(n-t-1)$ corrupted signers with non-negligible probability then there exists an algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ which outputs x_0 such that $y_0 = g_0(x_0)$ on input a modulus n_0, an exponent e_0 and random value y_0 with non-negligible probability.

Algorithm $\mathcal{A}$ accepts the public keys $PK_1, \ldots, PK_n$ and is given oracle access to the random oracle $\mathcal{H}$ and to an $(n-t)$-out-of-n ring signing oracle and can corrupt $(n-t-1)$ signers. We assume that algorithm $\mathcal{A}$ can produce a valid $(n-t)$-out-of-n threshold ring signature on a new message which was not queried to the signing oracle, with non-negligible probability.

Algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ is with input y_0, n_0, e_0 chooses at random an index $i_0 \in [1,n]$ and a subset $I_0 \subset [1,n]$ of cardinality $t-1$ such that $i_0 \notin I_0$. Algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ hopes that algorithm $\mathcal{A}$ corrupts the member in I_0. Algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ sets P_{i_0}'s public key to (n_0, e_0), and generates $t-1$ pairs of matching secret/ public keys for all members in I_0, and sets other members' public keys at random (i.e., the corresponding secret keys will not be used). Algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ chooses at random an integer t_0 in $[1, Q]$. It also chooses at random q_0, q_0' in $[1, q(\ell)]$ such that $q_0 < q_0'$, where $q(\ell)$ is the total number of queries for $\mathcal{H}$.

Algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ simulates the random oracle $\mathcal{H}$ in the usual way, answering a random value for each new query, and maintaining a list of already queried messages. However, we add the following rule. Let Γ_0 be the XOR between the argument of the q_0-th query for the oracle $\mathcal{H}$ and the answer to the q_0'-th query, and γ_0 be the substring of Γ_0, corresponding to $[\Gamma_0]_{\ell(t_0-1)+1}$ through $[\Gamma_0]_{\ell t_0}$, where $[x]_i$ denotes the i-th bit of the string x. On the q_0'-th query for $\mathcal{H}$, algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ answers $y_0 \oplus r_0$, where r_0 is the value the q_0-th query was made on.

Algorithm $\mathcal{A}$ is allowed to query for the secret key of up to $t-1$ members, in an adaptive way. Such queries are answered in a straightforward way, except if asked to P_j, $j \notin I_0$. In that case, algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ halts and outputs "`FAIL`". The probability that algorithm $\mathcal{A}$ guesses correctly the subset I_0 of corrupted members is at least $1/\binom{n}{t-1}$.

Algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ can also simulate a signing oracle, simply by choosing randomly the components of the signature, and by adapting its answers to the queries for $\mathcal{H}$.

Alogorithm $\mathcal{A}$ outputs a t-forgery:

$$(m^*, \sigma_1, \ldots, \sigma_p),$$

where $p = 2^{t+1} \log n$ and each $\sigma_i = (PK^{1,1}_{p_i}, \ldots, PK_{p_i^{1,Q}}, PK_{p_i^{2,1}}, \ldots, PK_{p_i^{t+1,Q}}; i_0; v_{i_0}; x_1^1, \ldots, x_1^Q, x_2^1, \ldots, x_{t+1}^Q)$. If there exists an index i, j for which $g_{i_0}(x_i^j) = y_0$, then algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ outputs x_i^j, otherwise, it outputs "`FAIL`".

However, algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ does not know which queries will be these queries in the forged $(n-t)$-out-of-n threshold ring signature, and thus algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ has to guess their identity for slipping y_0 as the gap. Hence, the probability that these queries were the q_0-th and q_0'-th queries is at leaset $1/\{q(\ell)\}^2$. Moreover, since algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ does not know which signature σ_j for the fair partition π_i^j is queried and which g_0 is used in G_i^j, the probability of guessing t_0 correctly is at least $\frac{1}{p} \cdot \frac{1}{Q}$, where $p = 2^{t+1} \log n$ and Q is the maximum number of the elements in the partition. Therefore, algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ outputs a valid x_0 such that $x_0 = g_0^{-1}(y_0)$ with the probability at least $\frac{1}{p} \cdot \frac{1}{Q} \cdot \frac{1}{\{q(\ell)\}^2} \cdot \frac{1}{\binom{n}{t-1}} \mathtt{Succ}^{\mathcal{H},sign}_{forge,\mathcal{A}}(\ell)$, where $\mathtt{Succ}^{\mathcal{H},sign}_{forge,\mathcal{A}}(\ell)$ is the probability that algorithm $\mathcal{A}$ produces a valid $(n-t)$-out-of-n threshold ring signature on a new message.

By assumption, $\mathtt{Succ}^{\mathcal{H},sign}_{forge,\mathcal{A}}(\ell)$ is non-negligible. Therefore, since algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ can invert g_0 with non-negligible probability, this is contradiction that g_i is a one-way permutation.

- **Anonymity.** In the Bresson–Stern–Szydlo threshold ring signature scheme, the identities of t signers are unconditionally protected since this scheme based on the notion of fair partitions. Similarly, since our scheme based on the notion of fair partitions, the identities of t non-signers are unconditionally protected in our scheme. Thus, the identities of $n-t$ signers are unconditionally protected.

3.3 Efficiency

We discuss the efficiency of our scheme. The size of an $(n-t)$-out-of-n threshold ring signature is $2^t \log n \times \{2\left((t+1) \times Q \times \ell\right) + \ell \times Q\} = \mathcal{O}(\ell 2^t n \log n)$. The time complexity of singing is $Q \times 2^t \log n$ inversions of the g's functions and $Q \times (t+1) \times 2^t \log n = \mathcal{O}(2^t n \log n)$ computations in the easy direction. Our scheme is clearly more efficient than generic solution such that making ring signatures for all subgroups cardinality $n-t+1$ since this would lead to $\binom{n}{t-1} = \mathcal{O}(n^{t-1})$ size.

4 Concluding Remarks

In this paper, we have proposed an efficient $(n-t)$-out-of-n threshold ring signature scheme which is efficient when t is small compared with n. Our scheme has a kind of dual structure of the Bresson–Stern–Szydlo threshold ring signature scheme, which is infeasible when t is small compared with n. In particular, we modify the trap-door one-way permutations in the ring signature scheme, and use a combinatorial notion called *fair partition*. Our scheme is provably secure in the random oracle model.

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