Research Reports on Mathematical and Computing Sciences

Completeness of Hilbert-style axiomatization for the extended computation tree logic ECTL

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March 2012, C–279

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series C: Computer Science

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Abstract

We give a complete Hilbert-style axiomatization for ECTL, which is an extension of the Computation Tree Logic (CTL) with a modal operator "infinitely often along some path".

1 Introduction


We treat extensions of the propositional Computation Tree Logic (CTL) (see, e,g, [5, 9] for general information on CTL and its neighbors). CTL has eight modal operators $\forall X$, $\exists X$, $\forall G$, $\exists G$, $\forall F$, $\exists F$, $\forall U$, and $\exists U$. For example, $\forall X \alpha$ (or $\exists X \alpha$), $\forall G \beta$ (or $\exists F \beta$), and $\gamma \forall U \delta$ (or $\gamma \exists U \delta$) represent " α holds for any (or some) next state", " β holds for any (or some) reachable state", and "along any (or some) path, γ holds until δ ", respectively. There are a lot of extensions of CTL; among them, the logic CTL* is well studied. CTL* has six modal operators \forall , \exists , X, G, F, and U. For example, $\forall \exists \mathsf{FXGXF}\forall p$ is a CTL*-formula but not a CTL-formula. Note that, for example, " $\forall G$ " is a single operator in CTL while this represents successive applications of two operators G and \forall in CTL*.

In this paper we treat the logic ECTL (by Emerson and Halpern [3]), which is a logic between CTL and CTL*. ECTL is obtained from CTL by adding two modal operators $\forall \mathsf{FG}$ and $\exists \mathsf{GF}$ where $\forall \mathsf{FG}\alpha$ and $\exists \mathsf{GF}\beta$ represent "along any path, there exists a state after which α always holds", and "there is a path along which β holds infinitely often" respectively (these two modalities are not expressible in CTL; see [3]). ECTL is a reasonable extension of CTL in the following sense: For any sequence \vec{s} of the unary modal operators \forall , \exists , X, G, and F where the first element of \vec{s} is \forall or \exists , there is a sequence $\vec{s'}$ of the unary modal operators $\forall X$, $\exists X$, $\forall G$, $\exists G$, $\forall F$, $\exists F$, $\forall \mathsf{FG}$, and $\exists \mathsf{GF}$ such that two formulas $\vec{s}p$ and $\vec{s'}p$ are equivalent (this will be shown in Section 2). For example, the CTL*-formula $\forall \exists \mathsf{FXGXF}\forall p$ is equivalent to the ECTL-formula $\exists X \exists X \exists \mathsf{GF}p$. A CTL*-formula whose outermost operator is \forall or \exists is called a *state formula*; hence the above property says that *each unary modality of state formulas of CTL* is expressible in ECTL*.

In general, to find a simple Hilbert-style axiomatization is a challenging problem in the study of non-classical logics. For example, its solutions for CTL* were published

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Figure 1: Property of models (1)



in the 2000s (Reynolds [7, 8]), while an axiomatization for CTL was given in the 1980s (Emerson and Halpern [2]). This paper gives a solution for ECTL — we prove that ECTL is axiomatized by adding the following schemata to CTL.

$$\begin{array}{l} \forall \mathsf{G}(\alpha \to \beta) \to \exists \mathsf{GF}\alpha \to \exists \mathsf{GF}\beta \\ \exists \mathsf{GF}\alpha \leftrightarrow \exists \mathsf{X} \exists \mathsf{F}(\alpha \land \exists \mathsf{GF}\alpha) \\ \forall \mathsf{G}(\alpha \to \exists \mathsf{X} \exists \mathsf{F}\alpha) \to \alpha \to \exists \mathsf{GF}\alpha \\ \forall \mathsf{FG}\alpha \leftrightarrow \neg \exists \mathsf{GF}\neg\alpha \end{array}$$

The first schema is a kind of "K-axiom" for $\exists \mathsf{GF}$, the second one says that $\exists \mathsf{GF}\varphi$ is a fixed point of $\exists \mathsf{X} \exists \mathsf{F}(\varphi \land \bullet)$, the third one is an induction axiom, and the forth one shows the duality between $\forall \mathsf{FG}$ and $\exists \mathsf{GF}$.

We show the completeness theorem: If a formula is not provable in the above system of ECTL, then there exists a finite model in which the formula is false in some state. As usual this is shown by constructing a model, of which each state is a kind of maximally consistent set; and in this construction, the following properties of models play a key role to define the accessibility relation. (For a formula ψ , the term " ψ -state" below denotes any state satisfying ψ .)

- (1) Let v, α and β be formulas such that v implies both $\alpha \exists \bigcup \beta$ and $\neg \beta$. If there is a v-state x, there is a path starting from x along which α holds until β . Then, on this path, there must be *the last v-state* x' *before the* β *-state*, and the next state of x' satisfies the formula $(\alpha \land \neg v) \exists \bigcup \beta$ (see Figure 1 where \bigcirc is an α -state and \bigstar is a β -state).
- (2) Let v, α and β be formulas such that v implies both $\alpha \forall \mathsf{U} \beta$ and $\neg \beta$. If there is a v-state x, then there must be a last v-state x' before β -states, and all the next states of x' satisfy the formula $(\alpha \land \neg v) \forall \mathsf{U} \beta$ (see Figure 2 where \bigcirc is an α -state and \bigstar is a β -state).
- (3) Let v and φ be formulas such that v implies both $\forall \mathsf{FG} \neg \varphi$ and φ . If there is a v-state x, then there must be a last v-state x' (\because otherwise we can construct a path along which infinitely many sates satisfy v and hence φ), and all the next states of x' satisfy the formula $\forall \mathsf{G} \neg v$ (see Figure 3).

Incidentally, the properties (1) and (2) were used by Lange and Stirling [6] for focus games and by Brünnler and Lange [1] and by Gaintzarain et al. [4] for sequent calculi.

The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we define models of ECTL and CTL^{*}, and we show that each unary modality of state formulas of CTL^{*} is expressible in ECTL. In Section 3 we introduce Hilbert-style axiomatization of ECTL, and we show derivability of certain formulas and of inference rules. In Section 4 we describe an outline of a standard completeness-proof for normal modal logics. In Section 5 we introduce





Figure 3: Property of models (3)



"consistent c-valuations", which will become the states of our model. In Section 6 we give an elaborate definition of the accessibility relation, and we show some lemmas on it. These definitions and lemmas are the main technical contribution of this paper. Finally in Section 7 we prove the completeness.

2 Semantics

In this section, we give a standard definitions of formulas and models for ECTL and CTL^{*}.

ECTL-formulas are constructed from the following symbols: propositional variables and constants \top and \bot ; unary logical operator \neg ; binary logical connectives \land , \lor , \rightarrow , and \leftrightarrow ; unary modal operators $\forall X$, $\exists X$, $\forall G$, $\exists G$, $\forall F$, $\exists F$, $\forall FG$ and $\exists GF$; and binary modal connectives $\forall U$ and $\exists U$. *CTL*-formulas* are constructed from the following symbols: propositional variables/constants and unary/binary logical symbols as above; unary modal operators \forall , \exists , X, G, and F; and binary modal connective U. Propositional variables are denoted by p, q, \ldots , and formulas are denoted by $\alpha, \beta, \varphi, \psi, \ldots$. For example, $\mathsf{GF}\forall Xp$, $\exists \mathsf{GF}\forall Xp$, and $\exists \mathsf{GF}\forall\forall Xp$ are CTL*-formulas and the second one is also an ECTL-formula while the others are not. Note that the intended meaning of the ECTL-formula $p \forall U q$ (or $p \exists U q$) and CTL*-formula $\forall (p U q)$ (or $\exists (p U q)$, respectively) are equivalent. Parentheses are omitted by the convention that unary operators bind more stronger than binary connectives; \land , \lor , $\forall U$, $\exists U$, U bind more stronger than \rightarrow and \leftrightarrow ; and that $\alpha_1 \rightarrow \alpha_2 \rightarrow$ $\dots \rightarrow \alpha_n$ is $\alpha_1 \rightarrow (\alpha_2 \rightarrow (\dots \rightarrow (\alpha_{n-1} \rightarrow \alpha_n) \cdots))$. For example, $\forall \mathsf{G}(\alpha \rightarrow \beta) \rightarrow \exists \mathsf{GF}\alpha \rightarrow$ $\exists \mathsf{GF}\beta$ (the first axiom of ECTL in the previous section) is $(\forall \mathsf{G}(\alpha \rightarrow \beta)) \rightarrow ((\exists \mathsf{GF}\alpha) \rightarrow$ $(\exists \mathsf{GF}\beta))$.

By "model", we mean any triple $\langle S, R, V \rangle$ where S is a nonempty set, R is a binary relation on S satisfying $(\forall x \in S)(\exists y \in S)(xRy)$ (we call such a relation serial), and V is a mapping from $S \times \text{PropVar}$ to $\{t, f\}$ where PropVar is the set of propositional variables. The elements of S are called *states*, and R is called the *accessibility relation*. A model is said to be *finite* if the set S of states is finite. A *path* is an infinite sequence $\langle x_0, x_1, x_2, \ldots \rangle$ of states such that $(\forall i \geq 0)(x_iRx_{i+1})$. If $\sigma = \langle x_0, x_1, x_2, \ldots \rangle$ is a path, then the state x_i is denoted by $\sigma(i)$, and the path $\langle x_n, x_{n+1}, x_{n+2}, \ldots \rangle$ is denoted by $\sigma|_n$, which is obtained from σ by deleting initial n elements. For any two paths σ and σ' , we write " $\sigma =_0 \sigma'$ " if and only if $\sigma(0) = \sigma'(0)$. We say that a path σ is an x-path if and only if $\sigma(0) = x$.

Truth values of ECTL-formulas are evaluated in each state. The notion "in a model $M = \langle S, R, V \rangle$, a state x satisfies an ECTL-formula φ ", written by " $M, x \models \varphi$ " (or " $x \models \varphi$ " for short), is inductively defined as follows.

$$\begin{split} x &\models \top . \ x \not\models \downarrow \bot . \\ x &\models p \Longleftrightarrow V(x,p) = t. \\ x &\models \neg \alpha \iff x \not\models \alpha. \\ x &\models \alpha \land \beta \iff x \not\models \alpha \text{ and } x \models \beta. \\ \text{Logical connectives } \lor, \to, \leftrightarrow \text{ are evaluated similarly.} \\ x &\models \forall \mathsf{X}\alpha \iff (\forall y)(xRy \Rightarrow y \models \alpha). \\ x &\models \exists \mathsf{X}\alpha \iff (\exists y)(xRy \And y \models \alpha). \\ x &\models \forall \mathsf{G}\alpha \iff (\forall \sigma : x\text{-path})(\forall n \ge 0)(\sigma(n) \models \alpha). \\ x &\models \exists \mathsf{G}\alpha \iff (\exists \sigma : x\text{-path})(\forall n \ge 0)(\sigma(n) \models \alpha). \end{split}$$

$$\begin{aligned} x &\models \forall \mathsf{F}\alpha \iff (\forall \sigma : x \text{-path})(\exists n \ge 0)(\sigma(n) \models \alpha). \\ x &\models \exists \mathsf{F}\alpha \iff (\exists \sigma : x \text{-path})(\exists n \ge 0)(\sigma(n) \models \alpha). \\ x &\models \forall \mathsf{F}\mathsf{G}\alpha \iff (\forall \sigma : x \text{-path})(\exists n \ge 0)(\forall m \ge n)(\sigma(m) \models \alpha). \\ x &\models \exists \mathsf{G}\mathsf{F}\alpha \iff (\exists \sigma : x \text{-path})(\forall n \ge 0)(\exists m \ge n)(\sigma(m) \models \alpha). \\ x &\models \alpha \forall \mathsf{U}\beta \iff (\forall \sigma : x \text{-path})(\exists n \ge 0)(\sigma(n) \models \beta \& (\forall m < n)(\sigma(m) \models \alpha)). \\ x &\models \alpha \exists \mathsf{U}\beta \iff (\exists \sigma : x \text{-path})(\exists n \ge 0)(\sigma(n) \models \beta \& (\forall m < n)(\sigma(m) \models \alpha)). \end{aligned}$$

In the last two clauses, the state $\sigma(n)$, which satisfies β , is called the *witness of* $\alpha \forall U \beta$ (or $\alpha \exists U \beta$).

Truth values of CTL*-formulas are evaluated in each path. The notion "in a model $M = \langle S, R, V \rangle$, a path σ satisfies a CTL*-formula φ ", written by " $M, \sigma \models \varphi$ " (or " $\sigma \models \varphi$ " for short), is inductively defined as follows.

$$\begin{split} \sigma &\models \top . \ \sigma \not\models p \Longleftrightarrow V(\sigma(0), p) = t. \\ \sigma &\models \neg \alpha \iff \sigma \not\models \alpha. \\ \sigma &\models \neg \alpha \iff \sigma \not\models \alpha \text{ and } \sigma \models \beta. \\ \text{Logical connectives } \lor, \rightarrow, \leftrightarrow \text{ are evaluated similarly.} \\ \sigma &\models \forall \alpha \iff (\forall \sigma' =_0 \sigma)(\sigma' \models \alpha). \\ \sigma &\models \exists \alpha \iff (\exists \sigma' =_0 \sigma)(\sigma' \models \alpha). \\ \sigma &\models \forall \alpha \iff \sigma \mid_1 \models \alpha. \\ \sigma &\models \mathsf{G} \alpha \iff (\forall n \ge 0)(\sigma \mid_n \models \alpha). \\ \sigma &\models \mathsf{F} \alpha \iff (\exists n \ge 0)(\sigma \mid_n \models \alpha). \\ \sigma &\models \alpha \, \mathsf{U} \beta \iff (\exists n \ge 0) \big(\sigma \mid_n \models \beta \, \& \, (\forall m < n)(\sigma \mid_m \models \alpha) \big). \end{split}$$

We say that an ECTL-formula (or CTL*-formula) φ is *valid* if and only if $M, x(\text{or } \sigma) \models \varphi$ for any model M and any state x (or any path σ). Moreover we say that two formulas φ and ψ are *equivalent*, written by " $\varphi \equiv \psi$ ", if and only if the formula $\varphi \leftrightarrow \psi$ is valid.

As is mentioned in the previous section, each unary modality of state formulas of CTL* is expressible in ECTL:

Theorem 1 For any sequence \vec{s} of the unary modal operators \forall , \exists , X, G, and F of CTL^* where the first element of \vec{s} is \forall or \exists , there is a sequence $\vec{s'}$ of the unary modal operators $\forall X$, $\exists X$, $\forall G$, $\exists G$, $\forall F$, $\exists F$, $\forall FG$, and $\exists GF$ of ECTL such that $\vec{s}p \equiv \vec{s'}p$.

Proof We have the following equations in CTL*.

 $\begin{array}{l} \forall \forall \varphi \equiv \forall \varphi. \ \exists \exists \varphi \equiv \exists \varphi. \ \forall \exists \varphi \equiv \exists \varphi. \ \exists \forall \varphi \equiv \forall \varphi. \\ \mathsf{G}\mathsf{G}\varphi \equiv \mathsf{G}\varphi. \ \mathsf{F}\mathsf{F}\varphi \equiv \mathsf{F}\varphi. \ \mathsf{G}\mathsf{F}\mathsf{G}\varphi \equiv \mathsf{F}\mathsf{G}\varphi. \ \mathsf{F}\mathsf{G}\mathsf{F}\varphi \equiv \mathsf{G}\mathsf{F}\varphi. \\ \mathsf{G}\mathsf{X}\varphi \equiv \mathsf{X}\mathsf{G}\varphi. \ \mathsf{F}\mathsf{X}\varphi \equiv \mathsf{X}\mathsf{F}\varphi. \ \forall \mathsf{X}\varphi \equiv \forall \mathsf{X}\forall \varphi. \ \exists \mathsf{X}\varphi \equiv \exists \mathsf{X}\exists \varphi. \\ \forall \mathsf{G}\mathsf{F}\varphi \equiv \forall \mathsf{G}\forall \mathsf{F}\varphi. \ \exists \mathsf{F}\mathsf{G}\varphi \equiv \exists \mathsf{F}\exists \mathsf{G}\varphi. \\ \forall p \equiv p. \ \exists p \equiv p. \end{array}$

Using these, we can construct $\vec{s'}$ from \vec{s} . For example, suppose $\vec{s} = \forall \forall \exists \mathsf{FXFGGXFGXG} \forall$. We have (1) $\forall \forall \exists \varphi \equiv \exists \varphi$, (2) $\mathsf{FXFGGXFGXG} \varphi \equiv \mathsf{XXXFFGGFGG} \varphi \equiv \mathsf{XXXFG} \varphi$, and (3) $\exists \forall p \equiv p$. Therefore $\vec{s}p = \forall \forall \exists \mathsf{FXFGGXFGXG} \forall p \equiv \exists \mathsf{XXXFG} p \equiv \exists \mathsf{X} \exists \mathsf{X} \exists \mathsf{X} \exists \mathsf{F} \mathsf{G} p$. $\exists \mathsf{X} \exists \mathsf{X} \exists \mathsf{X} \exists \mathsf{F} \exists \mathsf{G} p$. **QED**

3 Axiomatization

The rest of this paper is devoted to the completeness of Hilbert-style axiomatization for ECTL; hence, from now on, "formula" will mean "ECTL-formula". To simplify the argument, we decrease the number of logical and modal symbols. We adopt \top , \neg , \land , $\forall X$, $\forall U$, $\exists U$, and $\exists GF$ as primitive symbols, and the others are considered to be the abbreviations:

$$\begin{split} & \bot = \neg \top. \quad \varphi \lor \psi = \neg (\neg \varphi \land \neg \psi). \quad \rightarrow \text{ and } \leftrightarrow \text{ are defined as usual} \\ & \exists X \varphi = \neg \forall X \neg \varphi. \\ & \forall \mathsf{F} \varphi = \top \forall \mathsf{U} \varphi. \quad \exists \mathsf{G} \varphi = \neg \forall \mathsf{F} \neg \varphi = \neg (\top \forall \mathsf{U} \neg \varphi). \\ & \exists \mathsf{F} \varphi = \top \exists \mathsf{U} \varphi. \quad \forall \mathsf{G} \varphi = \neg \exists \mathsf{F} \neg \varphi = \neg (\top \exists \mathsf{U} \neg \varphi). \\ & \forall \mathsf{F} \mathsf{G} \varphi = \neg \exists \mathsf{G} \mathsf{F} \neg \varphi. \end{split}$$

"Q" will be used as a variable on $\{\forall, \exists\}$. For example, " $\alpha Q \cup \beta \leftrightarrow (\beta \lor (\alpha \land Q \mathsf{X}(\alpha Q \cup \beta)))$ " denotes two formulas " $\alpha \forall \bigcup \beta \leftrightarrow (\beta \lor (\alpha \land \forall \mathsf{X}(\alpha \forall \bigcup \beta)))$ " and " $\alpha \exists \bigcup \beta \leftrightarrow (\beta \lor (\alpha \land \exists \mathsf{X}(\alpha \exists \bigcup \beta)))$ ".

We fix a Hilbert-style axiomatization (axiom schemata and inference rules) of CTL; for example, the following are due to Goldblatt [5]:

$$\begin{array}{ll} \text{(Tautology)} & \text{Instances of classical tautologies.} \\ \text{(K}_{\forall \mathsf{X}}) & \forall \mathsf{X}(\alpha \to \beta) \to \forall \mathsf{X}\alpha \to \forall \mathsf{X}\beta. \\ \text{(D)} & \exists \mathsf{X} \top. \\ (\forall \mathsf{U}) & \alpha \,\forall \mathsf{U} \,\beta \leftrightarrow (\beta \lor (\alpha \land \forall \mathsf{X}(\alpha \,\forall \mathsf{U} \,\beta))). \\ (\exists \mathsf{U}) & \alpha \,\exists \mathsf{U} \,\beta \leftrightarrow (\beta \lor (\alpha \land \exists \mathsf{X}(\alpha \,\exists \mathsf{U} \,\beta))). \\ \\ \hline \alpha \to \beta \quad \alpha \\ \hline \beta & (\text{modus ponens}) & \hline \alpha \\ \hline \forall \mathsf{X}\alpha \\ \hline \forall \mathsf{X}\alpha \\ (\forall \mathsf{X}\text{-necessitaion}) \\ \\ \hline \beta \lor (\alpha \land \forall \mathsf{X}\gamma) \to \gamma \\ \hline \alpha \,\forall \mathsf{U} \,\beta \to \gamma \\ \end{array} (\forall \mathsf{U}\text{-induction}) \quad \frac{\beta \lor (\alpha \land \exists \mathsf{X}\gamma) \to \gamma}{\alpha \,\exists \mathsf{U} \,\beta \to \gamma} \text{ (}\exists \mathsf{U}\text{-induction}) \\ \end{array}$$

We call this system H_{CTL} . Then our main system H_{ECTL} for ECTL is defined by adding the following axiom schemata to H_{CTL} .

$$\begin{array}{ll} (\mathrm{K}_{\exists \mathsf{GF}}) & \forall \mathsf{G}(\alpha \to \beta) \to \exists \mathsf{GF}\alpha \to \exists \mathsf{GF}\beta. \\ (\exists \mathsf{GF}) & \exists \mathsf{GF}\alpha \leftrightarrow \exists \mathsf{X} \exists \mathsf{F}(\alpha \land \exists \mathsf{GF}\alpha). \\ (\exists \mathsf{GF}\text{-induction}) & \forall \mathsf{G}(\alpha \to \exists \mathsf{X} \exists \mathsf{F}\alpha) \to \alpha \to \exists \mathsf{GF}\alpha. \end{array}$$

Note that the forth axiom $\forall \mathsf{FG}\alpha \leftrightarrow \neg \exists \mathsf{GF} \neg \alpha$ in Section 1 is a tautology because of the abbreviation of $\forall \mathsf{FG}$.

By " $\vdash \varphi$ ", we mean " φ is provable in H_{ECTL}". The purpose of this paper is to show the soundness and completeness of H_{ECTL} with respect to arbitrary and finite models:

Theorem 2 (Main Theorem) The following three conditions are equivalent for any formula φ_0 . (1) $\vdash \varphi_0$. (2) φ_0 is valid. (3) φ_0 is valid with respect to finite models, i.e., $M, x \models \varphi_0$ for any finite model M and any state x.

Proof Soundness $(1 \Rightarrow 2 \Rightarrow 3)$ is easily shown by verifying that each axiom is valid and that each rule preserves validity of formulas. Completeness $(3 \Rightarrow 1)$ is hard as usual; the

contraposition $(\neg 1 \Rightarrow \neg 3)$ will be proved by Theorem 41 at the end of this paper. **QED**

In the rest of this section, we show some lemmas which give a list of provable formulas and derivable inferences of $\mathcal{H}_{\text{ECTL}}$. In the following, *finite* sets of formulas are denoted by Γ, Δ, \ldots If $\Gamma = \{\gamma_1, \gamma_2, \ldots, \gamma_n\}$, then $\bigwedge \Gamma$ and $\bigvee \Gamma$ denote the formulas $\gamma_1 \land \gamma_2 \land \cdots \land \gamma_n$ (or \top if n = 0) and $\gamma_1 \lor \gamma_2 \lor \cdots \lor \gamma_n$ (or \bot if n = 0) respectively; moreover if \bullet is one of the unary operators, then $\bullet \Gamma$ denotes the set $\{\bullet\gamma_1, \bullet\gamma_2, \ldots, \bullet\gamma_n\}$. By " $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$ ", we mean $\vdash \bigwedge \Gamma \to \varphi$. As usual, for example, " $\Gamma, \alpha, \beta, \Delta \vdash \gamma$ " means " $\Gamma \cup \{\alpha, \beta\} \cup \Delta \vdash \gamma$ ".

We say that an inference

$$\frac{\Gamma_1 \vdash \varphi_1 \quad \Gamma_2 \vdash \varphi_2 \quad \cdots \quad \Gamma_n \vdash \varphi_n}{\Delta \vdash \psi}$$

is *derivable* if and only if there is a derivation from n formulas $\bigwedge \Gamma_1 \to \varphi_1, \ldots, \bigwedge \Gamma_n \to \varphi_n$ to the formula $\bigwedge \Delta \to \psi$ in H_{ECTL}. The inference rules of classical logic and of normal modal logic ($\forall X$ is the modal operator) are available; for example:

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash \varphi \lor \varphi' \quad \varphi', \Delta \vdash \psi}{\Gamma, \Delta \vdash \varphi \lor \psi} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash \varphi}{\forall \mathsf{X} \Gamma \vdash \forall \mathsf{X} \varphi} \quad \overline{\vdash \forall \mathsf{X}(\alpha \land \beta) \leftrightarrow \forall \mathsf{X} \alpha \land \forall \mathsf{X} \beta}$$

We will tacitly use such inferences.

Lemma 3 (Property of $\forall G$) The inference rules

$$\frac{\vdash \gamma \to \varphi \land \forall X\gamma}{\vdash \gamma \to \forall \mathsf{G}\varphi} \; (\forall \mathsf{G}\text{-induction}) \quad \frac{\vdash \varphi}{\vdash \forall \mathsf{G}\varphi} \; (\forall \mathsf{G}\text{-necessitaion}) \\ \frac{\forall \mathsf{G}\Gamma \vdash \varphi}{\forall \mathsf{G}\Gamma \vdash \forall \mathsf{G}\varphi} \; (\forall \mathsf{G}\text{-R}) \qquad \qquad \frac{\varphi, \Gamma \vdash \psi}{\forall \mathsf{G}\varphi, \Gamma \vdash \psi} \; (\forall \mathsf{G}\text{-L})$$

are derivable, and the following schemata ($\forall G$), ($K_{\forall G}$) and ($4_{\forall G}$) are provable.

$$\begin{array}{ll} (\forall \mathsf{G}) & \forall \mathsf{G}\varphi \leftrightarrow \varphi \land \forall \mathsf{X} \forall \mathsf{G}\varphi. \\ (\mathsf{K}_{\forall \mathsf{G}}) & \forall \mathsf{G}(\alpha \rightarrow \beta) \rightarrow \forall \mathsf{G}\alpha \rightarrow \forall \mathsf{G}\beta \\ (4_{\forall \mathsf{G}}) & \forall \mathsf{G}\varphi \rightarrow \forall \mathsf{G}\forall \mathsf{G}\varphi. \end{array}$$

Proof \forall G-induction rule is equivalent to an instance of \exists U-induction rule:

$$\frac{\neg \varphi \lor (\top \land \exists \mathsf{X} \neg \gamma) \to \neg \gamma}{\top \exists \mathsf{U} \neg \varphi \to \neg \gamma} \ (\exists \mathsf{U}\text{-ind.})$$

 $\forall G$ -necessitation rule is obtained from $\forall G$ -induction rule by replacing γ by \top using the fact $\vdash \forall X \top$. The scheme ($\forall G$) is provable from the axiom ($\exists U$) where $\alpha = \top$, $\beta = \neg \varphi$. The scheme ($K_{\forall G}$) is provable as follows.

$$\frac{(::\forall \mathsf{G})}{\forall \mathsf{G}(\alpha \to \beta) \to (\alpha \to \beta)} \quad \frac{(::\forall \mathsf{G})}{\forall \mathsf{G}\alpha \to \alpha} \quad \frac{(::\forall \mathsf{G})}{\forall \mathsf{G}(\alpha \to \beta) \to \forall \mathsf{X} \forall \mathsf{G}(\alpha \to \beta)} \quad \frac{(::\forall \mathsf{G})}{\forall \mathsf{G}\alpha \to \forall \mathsf{X} \forall \mathsf{G}(\alpha \to \beta)} \\ \frac{\forall \mathsf{G}(\alpha \to \beta) \land \forall \mathsf{G}\alpha \to \beta}{\forall \mathsf{G}(\alpha \to \beta) \land \forall \mathsf{G}\alpha \to \forall \mathsf{X} (\forall \mathsf{G}(\alpha \to \beta) \land \forall \mathsf{G}\alpha)} \\ \frac{\forall \mathsf{G}(\alpha \to \beta) \land \forall \mathsf{G}\alpha \to \beta \land \forall \mathsf{X} (\forall \mathsf{G}(\alpha \to \beta) \land \forall \mathsf{G}\alpha)}{\forall \mathsf{G}(\alpha \to \beta) \land \forall \mathsf{G}\alpha \to \forall \mathsf{G}\beta} \quad (\forall \mathsf{G}\text{-ind.})$$

The schema $(4_{\forall G})$ is provable using $(\forall G)$ and $\forall G$ -induction rule. Derivability of the rules $(\forall G-R/L)$ is easily shown (like the rules of the modal logic S4). QED

Lemma 4 (1) $\forall \mathsf{G}(\alpha \to \alpha'), \ \forall \mathsf{X}\alpha \vdash \forall \mathsf{X}\alpha'.$

- $(2) \ \forall \mathsf{G}(\alpha \to \alpha'), \ \alpha \ Q \mathsf{U} \ \beta \ \vdash \ \alpha' \ Q \mathsf{U} \ \beta.$
- (3) $\forall \mathsf{G}(\beta \to \beta'), \ \alpha \ Q \mathsf{U} \ \beta \ \vdash \ \alpha \ Q \mathsf{U} \ \beta'.$
- (4) $\forall \mathsf{G}(\alpha \to \alpha'), \exists \mathsf{GF}\alpha \vdash \exists \mathsf{GF}\alpha'.$

Proof We show only an outline of (2).

$$\frac{(: QU)}{\beta \lor (\alpha' \land QX(\alpha' QU \beta)) \rightarrow \alpha' QU \beta} \\
\stackrel{\vdots}{\underset{\alpha QU \beta}{\overset{\beta}{\longrightarrow}} \forall \mathsf{G}(\alpha \rightarrow \alpha') \rightarrow \alpha' QU \beta)}{\overset{\beta}{\longrightarrow} \forall \mathsf{G}(\alpha \rightarrow \alpha') \rightarrow \alpha' QU \beta} (QU-\text{ind.})$$

Note that Lemma 4(4) is the axiom $(K_{\exists GF})$, which will be used in not only the next lemma but also Lemma 29 in Section 6

Lemma 5 The following inference rule is derivable.

$$\frac{\alpha \leftrightarrow \alpha'}{\varphi[\alpha] \leftrightarrow \varphi[\alpha']}$$

where $\varphi[\alpha']$ is the formula that is obtained from the formula $\varphi[\alpha]$ by replacing one occurrence of subformula α by α' .

Proof By induction on φ , using Lemmas 3 and 4.

Lemma 5 guarantees that provability of a formula is preserved when we replace a subformula by another equivalent formula. We will tacitly use this property.

Lemma 6 (Property of $\forall U$ and $\exists U$) (1) $\beta \vdash \alpha Q \cup \beta$.

- $(2) \vdash \top Q \mathsf{U} \top.$
- (3) $\alpha Q \bigcup \beta \vdash \alpha \lor \beta$.
- (4) $\alpha Q \bigcup \beta \vdash \beta \lor Q \mathsf{X}(\alpha Q \bigcup \beta).$
- (5) α , $QX(\alpha QU\beta) \vdash \alpha QU\beta$.

Proof Use the axioms $(\forall U)$ and $(\exists U)$.

Lemma 7 The following inference rule, which is a variant of QU-induction, is derivable.

$$\frac{\forall \mathsf{G} \Delta, \ \beta \lor Q \mathsf{X}((\alpha \land \gamma) \ Q \mathsf{U} \ \beta) \ \vdash \ \gamma}{\forall \mathsf{G} \Delta, \ \alpha \ Q \mathsf{U} \ \beta \ \vdash \ \gamma}$$

QED

QED

QED

Proof First we consider the case that Δ is empty. We have the following derivation.

$\beta \lor QX((\alpha \land \gamma) QU \beta) \vdash \gamma$	(assumption)	(3.1)
$\beta \lor (\alpha \land QX((\alpha \land \gamma) QU \beta)) \vdash \beta \lor QX((\alpha \land \gamma) QU \beta)$	β) (tautology)	(3.2)
$\beta \lor ((\alpha \land \gamma) \land QX((\alpha \land \gamma) QU \beta) \vdash (\alpha \land \gamma) QU \beta$	(axiom (QU))	(3.3)
$\beta \lor (\alpha \land QX((\alpha \land \gamma) QU\beta)) \vdash (\alpha \land \gamma) QU\beta$	(:: 3.1, 3.2, 3.3)	(3.4)
$\alpha \ Q U \ \beta \ \vdash \ (\alpha \land \gamma) \ Q U \ \beta$	(:: 3.4 and QU -ind.)	(3.5)
$(\alpha \wedge \gamma) \ Q U \ \beta \ \vdash \ (\alpha \wedge \gamma) \lor \beta$	(Lemma 6(3))	(3.6)
$\alpha \ Q U \ \beta \ \vdash \ \gamma$	(:: 3.1, 3.5, 3.6)	(3.7)

For a general case, put $\delta = \bigwedge \forall \mathsf{G} \Delta$.

$$\begin{split} \delta, \ \beta \lor Q\mathsf{X}((\alpha \land \gamma) \ Q\mathsf{U} \ \beta) &\vdash \gamma & (\text{assumption}) & (3.8) \\ \delta \vdash \forall \mathsf{G}((\delta \to \gamma) \to \gamma) & (\text{from Lemma 3}) & (3.9) \\ \forall \mathsf{G}((\delta \to \gamma) \to \gamma), \ \beta \lor Q\mathsf{X}(((\alpha \land (\delta \to \gamma)) Q\mathsf{U} \ \beta) \vdash \beta \lor Q\mathsf{X}(((\alpha \land \gamma) Q\mathsf{U} \ \beta) & (\text{from Lemma 4}) & (3.10) \\ \delta, \ \beta \lor Q\mathsf{X}((\alpha \land (\delta \to \gamma)) Q\mathsf{U} \ \beta) \vdash \gamma & (\because 3.8, 3.9, 3.10) \\ \beta \lor Q\mathsf{X}((\alpha \land (\delta \to \gamma)) Q\mathsf{U} \ \beta) \vdash \delta \to \gamma & (\land 3.8, 3.9, 3.10) \\ \end{split}$$

To this last formula, we apply the former derivation (from 3.1 to 3.7, where " γ " = " $\delta \rightarrow \gamma$ "), and we get the formula $\alpha Q \cup \beta \vdash \delta \rightarrow \gamma$, which is equivalent to the required formula $\delta, \alpha Q \cup \beta \vdash \gamma$. QED

Lemma 8 (Property of $\exists GF$) (1) $\exists GF\varphi \vdash \exists X \exists GF\varphi$.

- (2) $\exists X \exists GF \varphi \vdash \exists GF \varphi$.
- (3) $\exists \mathsf{GF}\varphi \vdash \exists \mathsf{F}(\varphi \land \exists \mathsf{X} \exists \mathsf{GF}\varphi).$

Proof We show an outline:

(1)
$$\exists \mathsf{GF}\varphi \vdash \exists \mathsf{X} \exists \mathsf{F}(\varphi \land \exists \mathsf{GF}\varphi) \quad (\because \exists \mathsf{GF} \text{ axiom}) \\ \vdash \exists \mathsf{X}((\varphi \land \exists \mathsf{GF}\varphi) \lor \exists \mathsf{X} \exists \mathsf{F}(\varphi \land \exists \mathsf{GF}\varphi)) \quad (\because \exists \mathsf{F}\psi \vdash \psi \lor \exists \mathsf{X} \exists \mathsf{F}\psi) \\ \vdash \exists \mathsf{X}(\exists \mathsf{GF}\varphi \lor \exists \mathsf{GF}\varphi) \quad (\because \exists \mathsf{F}\psi \vdash \psi \lor \exists \mathsf{X} \exists \mathsf{F}\psi) \\ \vdash \exists \mathsf{X}(\exists \mathsf{F}\varphi \land \forall \mathsf{GF}\varphi) \quad (\because \exists \mathsf{GF} \text{ axiom}) \\ \vdash \exists \mathsf{X} \exists \mathsf{F}(\varphi \land \exists \mathsf{GF}\varphi) \quad (\because \exists \mathsf{X} \exists \mathsf{F}\psi \vdash \exists \mathsf{F}\psi) \\ \vdash \exists \mathsf{GF}\varphi. \quad (\because \exists \mathsf{GF} \text{ axiom}) \\ \vdash \exists \mathsf{F}(\varphi \land \exists \mathsf{X} \exists \mathsf{F}\varphi) \quad (\because \exists \mathsf{X} \exists \mathsf{F}\psi \vdash \exists \mathsf{F}\psi) \\ \vdash \exists \mathsf{F}(\varphi \land \exists \mathsf{X} \exists \mathsf{GF}\varphi) \quad (\because \exists \mathsf{X} \exists \mathsf{F}\psi \vdash \exists \mathsf{F}\psi) \\ \vdash \exists \mathsf{F}(\varphi \land \exists \mathsf{X} \exists \mathsf{GF}\varphi). \quad (\because \exists \mathsf{X} \exists \mathsf{F}\psi \vdash \exists \mathsf{F}\psi) \\ \exists \mathsf{F}(\varphi \land \exists \mathsf{X} \exists \mathsf{GF}\varphi). \quad (\because \exists \mathsf{X} \exists \mathsf{F}\psi \vdash \exists \mathsf{F}\psi) \\ \exists \mathsf{F}(\varphi \land \exists \mathsf{X} \exists \mathsf{GF}\varphi). \quad (\because \exists \mathsf{X} \exists \mathsf{F}\psi \vdash \exists \mathsf{F}\psi) \\ \exists \mathsf{F}(\psi \land \mathsf{I} \mathsf{X} \exists \mathsf{GF}\varphi). \quad (\forall \exists \mathsf{X} \exists \mathsf{F}\psi \vdash \mathsf{F}\psi) \\ \exists \mathsf{I}(\mathsf{I})) \end{bmatrix} \mathbf{QED}$$

Note that the $\exists GF$ -induction axiom is not used in this section. It will be used in the proof of Lemma 30 in Section 6.

4 Completeness of K

It is well known that the smallest normal modal logic K is axiomatized by Tautology and $K_{\forall X}$ axioms and modus ponens and $\forall X$ -necessitation rules, where $\forall X$ is the only modal operator (usually written as \Box). K is complete with respect to finite Kripke models:

Proposition 9 (Completeness of K) If φ is not provable in K, then there exists a finite Kripke model $M = \langle S, R, V \rangle$ (R may not be serial) such that $M, x \not\models \varphi$ for some $x \in S$.

In this section, we show an outline of the standard proof of this completeness in order to utilize it as a base of our argument.

Definition 10 (valuation, \bullet_t , \bullet_f , \bullet^*) Let Γ be a finite set of formulas. A valuation of Γ is a function from Γ into $\{t, f\}$. If v is a valuation of Γ , then v_t and v_f are sets of formulas and v^* is a formula as follows.

$$\begin{split} v_{\mathsf{t}} &= \{ \varphi \mid \varphi \in \Gamma \text{ and } v(\varphi) = \mathsf{t} \}.\\ v_{\mathsf{f}} &= \{ \varphi \mid \varphi \in \Gamma \text{ and } v(\varphi) = \mathsf{f} \}.\\ v^* &= \bigwedge v_{\mathsf{t}} \land \bigwedge (\neg v_{\mathsf{f}}). \end{split}$$

Definition 11 ($\bullet_{t/\forall x}, \bullet \triangleright \bullet$) Let Γ be a finite set of formulas. For any valuation v of Γ , we define

$$v_{t/\forall x} = \{ \varphi \mid \forall X \varphi \in \Gamma \text{ and } v(\forall X \varphi) = t \}.$$

Then a relation \triangleright between valuations of Γ is defined as follows.

$$v \triangleright v' \iff v_{t/\forall x} \subseteq v'_t \iff (v(\forall X\varphi) = t \Rightarrow v'(\varphi) = t) \text{ for any } \forall X\varphi \text{ in } \Gamma.$$

Definition 12 (K-consistent) A valuation v is said to be K-consistent if and only if the formula $\neg(v^*)$ is not provable in K.

Then the required counter-model $M = \langle S, R, V \rangle$ for φ is constructed as follows. S is the set of K-consistent valuations of $\operatorname{Sub}(\varphi)$ where $\operatorname{Sub}(\varphi)$ is the set of subformulas of φ . $R = \triangleright$. V(v, p) = v(p). The condition $(\exists x \in S)(M, x \not\models \varphi)$ is shown by the following propositions.

Proposition 13 For any $\psi \in \text{Sub}(\varphi)$ and any $v \in S$, we have the following. (1) If $v(\psi) = t$, then $M, v \models \psi$. (2) If $v(\psi) = f$, then $M, v \not\models \psi$.

Proposition 14 If φ is not provable in K, then there is a K-consistent valuation v of $\operatorname{sub}(\varphi)$ such that $v(\varphi) = \mathbf{f}$.

Our completeness proof for ECTL is an elaborate extension of the above argument.

5 C-valuations

In our counter-model for H_{ECTL} , each state is not a valuation but a "valuation together with additional information" — we call this a *c-valuation* (*c* for "conditional" or "controlled"). The additional information is utilized to control the accessibility between states. In this section, we define c-valuations and we show some basic properties of them.

Definition 15 (c-valuation, designated formula) Let S be a finite set of formulas that contains at least one until-formula, where an "until-formula" is a formula of the form $\alpha QU\beta$. A c-valuation of S is a 4-tuple $\langle \mathcal{F}, \mathcal{H}, U, v \rangle$ that satisfies the following three conditions.

- Both \mathcal{F} and \mathcal{H} are sets of valuations of \mathbb{S} . (\mathcal{F} and \mathcal{H} are finite because so is \mathbb{S} .)
- U is an until-formula in S. (U is called the designated formula of this c-valuation.)
- v is a valuation of S.

Definition 16 (intended formula, consistent) Let $\mathcal{F} = \{v_1^{\mathcal{F}}, v_2^{\mathcal{F}}, \dots, v_m^{\mathcal{F}}\}$ and $\mathcal{H} = \{v_1^{\mathcal{H}}, v_2^{\mathcal{H}}, \dots, v_n^{\mathcal{H}}\}$ be sets of valuations of a set S. The intended formula of a c-valuation $\langle \mathcal{F}, \mathcal{H}, \alpha \, Q \, \bigcup \beta, v \rangle$ is

$$\forall \mathsf{G}\neg(v_1^{\mathcal{F}})^* \land \forall \mathsf{G}\neg(v_2^{\mathcal{F}})^* \land \dots \land \forall \mathsf{G}\neg(v_m^{\mathcal{F}})^* \land \left(\left(\alpha \land \neg(v_1^{\mathcal{H}})^* \land \neg(v_2^{\mathcal{H}})^* \land \dots \land \neg(v_n^{\mathcal{H}})^* \right) Q \mathsf{U} \beta \right) \land v^*.$$

(See Def.10 for "*".) We say that a c-valuation is consistent if and only if the negation of its intended formula is not provable in H_{ECTL} .

By the definitions, we have:

Proposition 17 The following conditions are equivalent where $\forall \mathsf{G} \neg \mathcal{F}^* = \{\forall \mathsf{G} \neg (v^*) \mid v \in \mathcal{F}\}$ and $\neg \mathcal{H}^* = \{\neg(v^*) \mid v \in \mathcal{H}\}.$

- A c-valuation $\langle \mathcal{F}, \mathcal{H}, \alpha \ Q \cup \beta, v \rangle$ is consistent.
- $\forall \mathsf{G} \neg \mathcal{F}^*$, $(\alpha \land \bigwedge \neg \mathcal{H}^*) Q \mathsf{U} \beta \not\vdash \neg(v^*)$.
- $\forall \mathsf{G} \neg \mathcal{F}^*, \ (\alpha \land \bigwedge \neg \mathcal{H}^*) \ Q \cup \beta, \ v_t \not\vdash \bigvee v_f.$
- $\forall \mathsf{G} \neg \mathcal{F}^*, \ (\alpha \land \bigwedge \neg \mathcal{H}^*) \ Q \mathsf{U} \ \beta, \ v^* \ \not\vdash \ \bigvee v_{\mathtt{f}}$

For example, suppose that $\mathbb{S} = \{p \exists U q, p, q\}$ and valuations v_1, v_2, v_3 are as follows.

$$\begin{array}{l} v_1(p \ \exists \mbox{U} \ q) = v_1(p) = v_1(q) = \mbox{t}. \\ v_2(p \ \exists \mbox{U} \ q) = v_2(p) = \mbox{t}, \quad v_2(q) = \mbox{f}. \\ v_3(p \ \exists \mbox{U} \ q) = \mbox{t}, \quad v_3(p) = v_3(q) = \mbox{f}. \end{array}$$

Then a c-valuation $\langle \{v_1, v_2\}, \{v_2, v_3\}, p \exists U q, v_3 \rangle$ is consistent if and only if

$$\begin{aligned} \forall \mathsf{G}\neg((p\exists \mathsf{U}q)\wedge p\wedge q), \ \forall \mathsf{G}\neg((p\exists \mathsf{U}q)\wedge p\wedge \neg q), \\ & \left(p\wedge\neg((p\exists \mathsf{U}q)\wedge p\wedge \neg q)\wedge\neg((p\exists \mathsf{U}q)\wedge \neg p\wedge \neg q)\right) \exists \mathsf{U}\,q, \ p\,\exists \mathsf{U}\,q \ \not\vdash \ p\vee q. \end{aligned}$$

Definition 18 ($\mathbb{C}(\cdot)$) For any finite set \mathbb{S} of formulas, $\mathbb{C}(\mathbb{S})$ denotes the set of consistent *c*-valuations of \mathbb{S} .

 $\mathbb{C}(\mathbb{S})$ will be the very set of states in our counter-model. From now on, when we write " $\mathbb{C}(\mathbb{S})$ ", we assume that \mathbb{S} is a finite set of formulas that contains at least one until-formula.

Lemma 19 $\mathbb{C}(\mathbb{S})$ is a finite set.

Proof $|\mathbb{C}(\mathbb{S})| \leq 2^m 2^m nm$ where $m \ (= 2^{|\mathbb{S}|})$ is the number of valuations of \mathbb{S} , and n is the number of until-formulas in \mathbb{S} . **QED**

Lemma 20 If $\langle \mathcal{F}, \mathcal{H}, \alpha | Q \cup \beta, v \rangle \in \mathbb{C}(\mathbb{S})$, then we have the following.

- (1) $v \notin \mathcal{F}$.
- (2) If $v(\beta) = \mathbf{f}$, then $v \notin \mathcal{H}$.
- (3) $v(\alpha Q \bigcup \beta) = t$.

Proof (1) If $v \in \mathcal{F}$, then $\forall \mathsf{G} \neg \mathcal{F}^* \vdash \neg(v^*)$ by Lemma 3, and the c-valuation is inconsistent by Proposition 17. (2) If $v \in \mathcal{H}$ and $v(\beta) = \mathsf{f}$, then $(\alpha \land \bigwedge \neg \mathcal{H}^*) Q \bigcup \beta \vdash \neg(v^*) \lor \bigvee v_{\mathsf{f}}$ by Lemma 6(3) ($\because \alpha \land \bigwedge \neg \mathcal{H}^* \vdash \neg(v^*)$ and $\beta \vdash \bigvee v_{\mathsf{f}}$), and the c-valuation is inconsistent by Proposition 17. (3) Similarly to (1) and (2), using the fact $(\alpha \land \bigwedge \neg \mathcal{H}^*) Q \bigcup \beta \vdash \alpha Q \bigcup \beta$ (\because Lemma 4(2)). QED

Lemma 21 Let \mathbb{T}_0 and \mathbb{F}_0 be disjoint subsets of a finite set \mathbb{S} of formulas, and Γ be a finite set of formulas. If $\Gamma, \mathbb{T}_0 \not\vdash \bigvee \mathbb{F}_0$, then there is a valuation v of \mathbb{S} such that $\mathbb{T}_0 \subseteq v_t$, $\mathbb{F}_0 \subseteq v_f$, and $\Gamma, v_t \not\vdash \bigvee v_f$.

Proof By the standard argument as follows. Let $\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \ldots, \sigma_n$ be an enumeration of the set $\mathbb{S} - (\mathbb{T}_0 \cup \mathbb{F}_0)$. We show that there are two disjoint sets \mathbb{T}_n and \mathbb{F}_n such that $\mathbb{T}_n \cup \mathbb{F}_n = \mathbb{S}, \mathbb{T}_0 \subseteq \mathbb{T}_n, \mathbb{F}_0 \subseteq \mathbb{F}_n$, and $\Gamma, \mathbb{T}_n \not\vdash \bigvee \mathbb{F}_n$. We define \mathbb{T}_i and \mathbb{F}_i , for $i = 1, \ldots, n$, as follows. Suppose \mathbb{T}_{i-1} and \mathbb{F}_{i-1} are already defined and $\Gamma, \mathbb{T}_{i-1} \not\vdash \bigvee \mathbb{F}_{i-1}$, then at least one of the following holds: (1) $\Gamma, \mathbb{T}_{i-1}, \sigma_i \not\vdash \bigvee \mathbb{F}_{i-1}$. (2) $\Gamma, \mathbb{T}_{i-1} \not\vdash \bigvee \mathbb{F}_{i-1} \lor \sigma_i$. Then we define $\langle \mathbb{T}_i, \mathbb{F}_i \rangle = \langle \mathbb{T}_{i-1} \cup \{\sigma_i\}, \mathbb{F}_{i-1} \rangle$ if the condition (1) holds, otherwise $\langle \mathbb{T}_i, \mathbb{F}_i \rangle =$ $\langle \mathbb{T}_{i-1}, \mathbb{F}_{i-1} \cup \{\sigma_i\} \rangle$.

6 Accessibility relation

From now on, we fix a formula φ_0 such that $\not\vdash \varphi_0$. The goal of this paper is to show the existence of a finite counter-model for φ_0 . For this purpose, the accessibility relation is defined in this section.

In the case of K, the set $\text{Sub}(\varphi_0)$ is sufficient to construct a counter-model for φ_0 (see Section 4); however we need a larger set, called \mathbb{S}_0 , for H_{ECTL} .

Definition 22 (\mathbb{S}_0) A set \mathbb{S}'_0 of formulas is defined by

$$\mathbb{S}'_0 = \operatorname{Sub}(\varphi_0, \top \forall \mathsf{U} \top, \top \exists \mathsf{U} \top, \forall \mathsf{X} \neg \top)$$

where $\operatorname{Sub}(\Gamma)$ is the set of subformulas of the formulas in Γ . Then a set \mathbb{S}_0 is defined by

$$\mathbb{S}_{0} = \operatorname{Sub}\Big(\{\forall \mathsf{X}(\alpha \forall \mathsf{U} \beta) \mid \alpha \forall \mathsf{U} \beta \in \mathbb{S}_{0}'\} \cup \{\forall \mathsf{X} \neg (\alpha \exists \mathsf{U} \beta) \mid \alpha \exists \mathsf{U} \beta \in \mathbb{S}_{0}'\} \cup \{\forall \mathsf{X} \neg (\top \exists \mathsf{U}(\alpha \land \neg \forall \mathsf{X} \neg \exists \mathsf{GF} \alpha)) \mid \exists \mathsf{GF} \alpha \in \mathbb{S}_{0}'\}\Big).$$

 \mathbb{S}_0 is defined so as to satisfy the following property:

Lemma 23 (1) \mathbb{S}_0 is a finite set including $\varphi_0, \top \forall U \top, \top \exists U \top$, and $\forall X \neg \top$.

(2) \mathbb{S}_0 is closed under subformulas.

- (3) If $\alpha \forall \mathsf{U} \beta \in \mathbb{S}_0$, then $\forall \mathsf{X}(\alpha \forall \mathsf{U} \beta) \in \mathbb{S}_0$.
- (4) If $\alpha \exists U \beta \in \mathbb{S}_0$, then $\forall X \neg (\alpha \exists U \beta) \in \mathbb{S}_0$.
- (5) If $\exists \mathsf{GF}\alpha \in \mathbb{S}_0$, then $\top \exists \mathsf{U}(\alpha \land \neg \forall \mathsf{X} \neg \exists \mathsf{GF}\alpha) \in \mathbb{S}_0$.

Proof Easy.

The following definitions (especially Def. 26) are the core of our completeness proof.

Definition 24 (next, Next) Let $\mathbb{U} = \{U_0, U_1, \dots, U_{N-1}\}$ be the set of until-formulas in \mathbb{S}_0 where $U_i \neq U_j$ if $i \neq j$. We define a function next(·) on \mathbb{U} by

 $\operatorname{next}(U_i) = U_{((i+1) \mod N)}.$

Then, for each valuation v of \mathbb{S}_0 , we define a function Next_v(·) on U by

Next_v(U) = next^m(U), where $m = \min\{m > 0 \mid v(next^m(U)) = t\}$.

For example, if $\mathbb{U} = \{U_0, U_1, \ldots, U_4\}$, $v(U_0) = v(U_2) = t$, and $v(U_1) = v(U_3) = v(U_4) = t$, then $\operatorname{Next}_v(U_0) = U_2$ and $\operatorname{Next}_v(U_3) = U_0$. The formula $\operatorname{Next}_v(U)$ is defined only if there exists a formula U_i such that $v(U_i) = t$.

Definition 25 (\existsGF-condition, witness condition) *Two conditions on a c-valuation* $\langle \mathcal{F}, \mathcal{H}, \alpha Q \bigcup \beta, v \rangle$ of \mathbb{S}_0 are defined as follows.

($\exists \mathsf{GF-condition}$) If $v(\exists \mathsf{GF}\varphi) = \mathfrak{f}$, then $v(\varphi) = \mathfrak{f}$, for any $\exists \mathsf{GF}\varphi$ in \mathbb{S}_0 .

(witness condition) $v(\beta) = t$.

Definition 26 (\rightsquigarrow) We define a binary relation \rightsquigarrow on $\mathbb{C}(\mathbb{S}_0)$ as follows. $\langle \mathcal{F}, \mathcal{H}, U, v \rangle \rightsquigarrow \langle \mathcal{F}', \mathcal{H}', U', v' \rangle$ if and only if all the conditions below are satisfied.

- (0) $\langle \mathcal{F}, \mathcal{H}, U, v \rangle, \langle \mathcal{F}', \mathcal{H}', U', v' \rangle \in \mathbb{C}(\mathbb{S}_0)$. (See Def. 18 for $\mathbb{C}(\mathbb{S}_0)$.)
- (1) $v \triangleright v'$. (See Def. 11 for \triangleright .)

QED

When $U = (\cdot$	$\cdots \forall U \cdots)$	witness cond.			When $U = (\cdots \exists U \cdots)$		witness cond.	
		Yes	No				Yes	No
∃GF-cond.	Yes	\heartsuit	\diamond		∃GF-cond.	Yes	\heartsuit	\heartsuit,\diamondsuit
	No	A	Å]		No	¢	♠ , ♣

Table 1: Admissible next states of $\langle \mathcal{F}, \mathcal{H}, U, v \rangle$.

(2) $\langle \mathcal{F}', \mathcal{H}', U', v' \rangle$ is one of the following forms

 $\langle \mathcal{F}, \emptyset, \operatorname{Next}_{v'}(U), v' \rangle$ (\heartsuit)

 $\langle \mathcal{F}, \mathcal{H} \cup \{v\}, U, v' \rangle$

 $\langle \mathcal{F} \cup \{v\}, \ \emptyset, \ \operatorname{Next}_{v'}(U), \ v' \rangle$

 (\diamondsuit)

 $\langle \mathcal{F} \cup \{v\}, \ \emptyset, \ U, \ v' \rangle$ (♣)

where Table 1 specifies the suits $(\heartsuit, \diamondsuit, \blacklozenge, \text{ or } \clubsuit)$ depending on the conditions of $\langle \mathcal{F}, \mathcal{H}, U, v \rangle$.

For example, if U is an $\exists U$ -formula and $\langle \mathcal{F}, \mathcal{H}, U, v \rangle$ satisfies neither the $\exists GF$ -condition nor witness condition, then $\langle \mathcal{F}', \mathcal{H}', U', v' \rangle$ must be \blacklozenge or \clubsuit .

Our counter-model is $\mathcal{M}_0 = \langle \mathbb{C}(\mathbb{S}_0), \rightsquigarrow, V_0 \rangle$ where V_0 will be defined in the next section. \mathcal{M}_0 is expected to have a property that each state $\langle \mathcal{F}, \mathcal{H}, \alpha Q \bigcup \beta, v \rangle$ satisfies its intended formula $\bigwedge (\forall \mathsf{G} \neg \mathcal{F}^*, (\alpha \land \bigwedge \neg \mathcal{H}^*) Q \bigcup \beta, v^*)$. According to this expectation, the above Definition 26 can be intuitively explained as follows.

Let $x = \langle \mathcal{F}, \mathcal{H}, U, v \rangle$ be a state of \mathcal{M}_0 . For each until-formula $\alpha Q \bigcup \beta$ in \mathbb{S}_0 , if $v(\alpha Q \bigcup \beta) = t$ then we need a witness (or witnesses) (i.e., a state y such that $x \rightsquigarrow \cdots \rightsquigarrow y$ and y satisfies β). The designated formula represents top-priority until-formula of which we seek a witness (or witnesses).

If x satisfies the witness condition, this means x itself is a witness of the designated formula, and then we shift the top-priority in the next states \heartsuit and \blacklozenge .

If x fails in the witness condition and the designated formula is $\alpha Q \cup \beta$, then x is a v^* -state and v^* implies both $\neg\beta$ and $\alpha Q \cup \beta$. In this case, as is explained in Section 1, there is a last v^* -state x' before β -states. Then the state \diamondsuit is intended to be a next state of not x but x'.

If x fails in the $\exists \mathsf{GF}$ -condition, then x is a v^* -state and v^* implies both φ and $\forall \mathsf{FG} \neg \varphi$ for some φ . In this case, as is explained in Section 1, there is a last v^* -state x'. Then the states \blacklozenge and \clubsuit are intended to be next states of not x but x'.

In the rest of this section, we show some important properties concerning the relation \rightsquigarrow . From now on, the expression $\langle \langle \mathcal{F}_i, \mathcal{H}_i, U_i, v_i \rangle_{(i=0,1,2...)} \rangle$ denotes an infinite \rightsquigarrow -sequence

$$\langle \mathcal{F}_0, \mathcal{H}_0, U_0, v_0 \rangle \rightsquigarrow \langle \mathcal{F}_1, \mathcal{H}_1, U_1, v_1 \rangle \rightsquigarrow \langle \mathcal{F}_2, \mathcal{H}_2, U_2, v_2 \rangle \rightsquigarrow \cdots$$

in $\mathbb{C}(\mathbb{S}_0)$.

Lemma 27 For any until-formula U in \mathbb{S}_0 and any c-valuation $\langle \mathcal{F}', \mathcal{H}', U', v' \rangle$ in $\mathbb{C}(\mathbb{S}_0)$, the until-formula Next_{v'}(U) is defined and it is different from U.

Proof Lemmas 6(2) and 23(1), and consistency of $\langle \mathcal{F}', \mathcal{H}', U', v' \rangle$ guarantee that $v'(\top \forall U \top) = v'(\top \exists U \top) = t$. This fact and the definition of $\operatorname{Next}_{v'}(U)$ imply this Lemma 27. **QED**

- **Lemma 28** (1) There is no infinite \rightsquigarrow -sequence $\langle \langle \mathcal{F}_i, \mathcal{H}_i, U_i, v_i \rangle_{(i=0,1,2...)} \rangle$ such that all the designated formulas U_0, U_1, U_2, \ldots are a same formula.
 - (2) Suppose $\exists \mathsf{GF}\varphi \in \mathbb{S}_0$. For any infinite \rightsquigarrow -sequence $\langle \langle \mathcal{F}_i, \mathcal{H}_i, U_i, v_i \rangle_{(i=0,1,2...)} \rangle$, there is a number k such that $(\forall i \geq k)(v_i(\exists \mathsf{GF}\varphi) = \mathbf{f} \text{ implies } v_i(\varphi) = \mathbf{f})$. In other words, in any infinite \rightsquigarrow -sequence, the $\exists \mathsf{GF}$ -condition (for $\exists \mathsf{GF}\varphi$) always holds after somewhere.

Proof (1) Assume that an infinite sequence $\langle \langle \mathcal{F}_i, \mathcal{H}_i, U_i, v_i \rangle_{(i=0,1,2...)} \rangle$ satisfies $U_i = U_{i+1}$ for all *i*. Lemma 27 and definition of \rightsquigarrow show that each \rightsquigarrow -step is defined by \diamondsuit or \clubsuit , and the witness condition always fails. Then Lemma 20 shows that either $\mathcal{F}_i \subsetneq \mathcal{F}_{i+1}$ (in \clubsuit) or $(\mathcal{F}_i = \mathcal{F}_{i+1} \text{ and } \mathcal{H}_i \subsetneq \mathcal{H}_{i+1})$ (in \diamondsuit) for each *i*. However, such an infinite \rightsquigarrow -sequence cannot exist because \mathcal{F}_i and \mathcal{H}_i are subsets of a finite set.

(2) Assume that an infinite sequence $\langle \langle \mathcal{F}_i, \mathcal{H}_i, U_i, v_i \rangle_{(i=0,1,2...)} \rangle$ contains infinitely many c-valuations that fail in the $\exists \mathsf{GF}$ -condition for $\exists \mathsf{GF}\varphi$. Then it contains infinitely many \blacklozenge or \clubsuit . This means that $\mathcal{F}_i \subseteq \mathcal{F}_{i+1}$ for all i, and $\mathcal{F}_i \subsetneq \mathcal{F}_{i+1}$ for infinitely many i; however this is impossible as (1). QED

Lemma 29 If a c-valuation $\langle \mathcal{F}, \mathcal{H}, U, v \rangle$ does not satisfy the $\exists \mathsf{GF}$ -condition, then $\exists \mathsf{GF}v^* \vdash \neg v^*$.

Proof By the premise, there is a formula φ such that $\exists \mathsf{GF}\varphi \in v_{\mathtt{f}}$ and $\varphi \in v_{\mathtt{t}}$. Then we have (1) $\exists \mathsf{GF}\varphi \vdash \neg v^*$, and (2) $v^* \vdash \varphi$, which implies (2⁺) $\exists \mathsf{GF}v^* \vdash \exists \mathsf{GF}\varphi$ using Lemma 4(4). The facts (1) and (2⁺) imply $\exists \mathsf{GF}v^* \vdash \neg v^*$. QED

Lemma 30 Let $\langle \mathcal{F}, \mathcal{H}, U, v \rangle$ be a c-valuation in $\mathbb{C}(\mathbb{S}_0)$ and $\forall X \psi$ be a formula in \mathbb{S}_0 . If $v(\forall X \psi) = \mathbf{f}$, then we have the following.

- (1) There is a valuation v' such that $v \triangleright v'$, $v'(\psi) = f$, and the c-valuation \heartsuit is consistent.
- (2) If the designated formula U is an $\forall U$ -formula and $\langle \mathcal{F}, \mathcal{H}, U, v \rangle$ does not satisfy the witness condition, then there is a valuation v' such that $v \triangleright v'$, $v'(\psi) = \mathbf{f}$, and the *c*-valuation \diamondsuit is consistent.
- (3) If $\langle \mathcal{F}, \mathcal{H}, U, v \rangle$ does not satisfy the $\exists \mathsf{GF}$ -condition, then there is a valuation v' such that $v \triangleright v', v'(\psi) = \mathbf{f}$, and the c-valuation \blacklozenge is consistent.
- (4) If the designated formula U is an $\forall U$ -formula and $\langle \mathcal{F}, \mathcal{H}, U, v \rangle$ satisfies neither the $\exists GF$ -condition nor the witness condition, then there is a valuation v' such that $v \triangleright v'$, $v'(\psi) = \mathbf{f}$, and the c-valuation \clubsuit is consistent.

Proof (1) First we show

$$\forall \mathsf{G} \neg \mathcal{F}^*, \ v_{\mathsf{t}/\forall \mathsf{x}} \not\models \psi. \tag{6.1}$$

Assume otherwise, then we have

$$\forall \mathsf{X} \forall \mathsf{G} \neg \mathcal{F}^*, \ \forall \mathsf{X} v_{\mathsf{t}} / \forall_{\mathsf{x}} \ \vdash \ \forall \mathsf{X} \psi,$$

and the c-valuation $\langle \mathcal{F}, \mathcal{H}, U, v \rangle$ would be inconsistent (i.e., $\forall \mathsf{G} \neg \mathcal{F}^*, (\alpha \land \land \{\neg \mathcal{H}^*\}) Q \mathsf{U} \beta, v_t \vdash \bigvee v_f$ where $U = \alpha Q \mathsf{U} \beta$) because of the facts

$$\forall \mathsf{G}\neg(v_i^*) \vdash \forall \mathsf{X} \forall \mathsf{G}\neg(v_i^*) \text{ for all } v_i \in \mathcal{F}$$
 (:: Lemma 3)

and

$$\forall \mathbf{X}\psi \in v_{\mathbf{f}} \text{ (premise of the lemma) and } \forall \mathbf{X}v_{\mathbf{t}/\forall \mathbf{x}} \subseteq v_{\mathbf{t}}.$$
(6.2)

Now the fact (6.1) and Lemma 21 imply existence of the required valuation v' such that $v_{t/\forall x} \subseteq v'_t, \ \psi \in v'_f$, and $\forall \mathsf{G} \neg \mathcal{F}^*, v'_t \not\vdash \bigvee v'_f$. (\heartsuit is consistent because $\operatorname{Next}_{v'}(U) \in v'_t$.) (2) Let $U = \alpha \forall \mathsf{U} \beta$. We define a formula γ by $\gamma = \alpha \land \bigwedge \neg \mathcal{H}^*$, and we will show

$$\forall \mathsf{G}\neg \mathcal{F}^*, \ (\gamma \land \neg v^*) \,\forall \mathsf{U}\,\beta, \ v_{\mathsf{t}/\forall \mathsf{x}} \not\vDash \psi, \tag{6.3}$$

which implies the existence of the required valuation v' as (1). Note that the failure of the witness condition means

$$\beta \in v_{\mathbf{f}}.\tag{6.4}$$

Now assume that the claim (6.3) does not hold, then we have the following derivation.

$$\begin{array}{ll} \forall \mathsf{G} \neg \mathcal{F}^*, \ (\gamma \land \neg v^*) \ \forall \mathsf{U} \ \beta, \ v_{\mathsf{t}/\forall \mathsf{x}} \ \vdash \ \psi. \qquad (\text{assumption}) \\ \forall \mathsf{X} \forall \mathsf{G} \neg \mathcal{F}^*, \ \forall \mathsf{X} \big((\gamma \land \neg v^*) \ \forall \mathsf{U} \ \beta \big), \ \forall \mathsf{X} v_{\mathsf{t}/\forall \mathsf{x}} \ \vdash \ \forall \mathsf{X} \psi. \\ \forall \mathsf{G} \neg \mathcal{F}^*, \ \beta \lor \forall \mathsf{X} \big((\gamma \land \neg v^*) \ \forall \mathsf{U} \ \beta \big) \ \vdash \ \neg v^*. \qquad (\because (6.2), (6.4), \text{ and Lemma 3}) \\ \forall \mathsf{G} \neg \mathcal{F}^*, \ \gamma \ \forall \mathsf{U} \ \beta \ \vdash \ \neg v^*. \qquad (\because \text{Lemma 7}) \end{array}$$

This contradicts the consistency of $\langle \mathcal{F}, \mathcal{H}, U, v \rangle$.

(3) As the proofs of (1) and (2), we show

 $\forall \mathsf{G}\neg \mathcal{F}^*, \ \forall \mathsf{G}\neg v^*, \ v_{\mathsf{t}/\forall \mathsf{x}} \not\vdash \psi.$

Assume otherwise, then we have the following derivation.

This contradicts the consistency of $\langle \mathcal{F}, \mathcal{H}, U, v \rangle$.

(4) Let $U = \alpha \forall \mathsf{U} \beta$. As the above proofs, we show

 $\forall \mathsf{G} \neg \mathcal{F}^*, \ \forall \mathsf{G} \neg v^*, \ \alpha \ \forall \mathsf{U} \ \beta, \ v_{\mathsf{t}/\forall \mathsf{x}} \ \not\vdash \ \psi.$

Assume otherwise, then we have the following derivation.

$$\forall \mathsf{G} \neg \mathcal{F}^*, \ \forall \mathsf{G} \neg v^*, \ \alpha \ \forall \mathsf{U} \ \beta, \ v_{\mathsf{t}/\forall \mathsf{x}} \vdash \psi.$$
 (assumption)
$$\forall \mathsf{X} \forall \mathsf{G} \neg \mathcal{F}^*, \ \forall \mathsf{X} \forall \mathsf{G} \neg v^*, \ \forall \mathsf{X} (\alpha \ \forall \mathsf{U} \ \beta), \ \forall \mathsf{X} v_{\mathsf{t}/\forall \mathsf{x}} \vdash \forall \mathsf{X} \psi.$$

$$\forall \mathsf{X} \forall \mathsf{G} \neg \mathcal{F}^*, \ \forall \mathsf{X} \forall \mathsf{G} \neg v^*, \ \alpha \ \forall \mathsf{U} \ \beta, \ \forall \mathsf{X} v_{\mathsf{t}/\forall \mathsf{x}} \vdash \beta \lor \forall \mathsf{X} \psi.$$
 (:: Lemma 6(4))
$$\forall \mathsf{X} \forall \mathsf{G} \neg \mathcal{F}^*, \ \forall \mathsf{X} \forall \mathsf{G} \neg v^* \vdash \neg v^*.$$
 (:: (6.2), (6.4) and Lemma 20(3))

Here we reach the step (\dagger) of the proof of (3), and the remaining steps are exactly same as (3). **QED**

Lemma 31 Let $\langle \mathcal{F}, \mathcal{H}, U, v \rangle$ be a c-valuation in $\mathbb{C}(\mathbb{S}_0)$. If $U = \alpha \exists U \beta$, then we have the following.

- (1) If $\langle \mathcal{F}, \mathcal{H}, U, v \rangle$ does not satisfy the witness condition, then there is a valuation v' such that $v \triangleright v'$, $v'(\alpha \exists U \beta) = t$ and the c-valuation \diamondsuit is consistent.
- (2) If $\langle \mathcal{F}, \mathcal{H}, U, v \rangle$ satisfies neither the $\exists \mathsf{GF}$ -condition nor the witness condition, then there is a valuation v' such that $v \triangleright v'$, $v'(\alpha \exists U \beta) = t$ and the c-valuation \clubsuit is consistent.

Proof (1) Put $\gamma = \alpha \wedge \bigwedge \neg \mathcal{H}^*$. Similarly to the proof of Lemma 30(2), we show

$$\forall \mathsf{G}\neg \mathcal{F}^*, \ (\gamma \land \neg v^*) \exists \mathsf{U} \beta, \ v_{\mathsf{t}/\forall \mathsf{x}}, \ \alpha \exists \mathsf{U} \beta \not\vdash \bot.$$

Assume otherwise, then we have the following derivation.

$$\forall \mathsf{G} \neg \mathcal{F}^*, \ (\gamma \land \neg v^*) \exists \mathsf{U} \ \beta, \ v_{\mathsf{t}/\forall \mathsf{x}}, \ \alpha \exists \mathsf{U} \ \beta \vdash \bot.$$
 (assumption)
$$\forall \mathsf{G} \neg \mathcal{F}^*, \ v_{\mathsf{t}/\forall \mathsf{x}}, \ (\gamma \land \neg v^*) \exists \mathsf{U} \ \beta \vdash \bot. \quad (\because (\gamma \land \neg v^*) \exists \mathsf{U} \ \beta \vdash \alpha \exists \mathsf{U} \ \beta, \text{ by Lemma 4(2)})$$

$$\forall \mathsf{X} \forall \mathsf{G} \neg \mathcal{F}^*, \ \forall \mathsf{X} v_{\mathsf{t}/\forall \mathsf{x}}, \ \exists \mathsf{X} ((\gamma \land \neg v^*) \exists \mathsf{U} \ \beta) \vdash \bot.$$

$$\forall \mathsf{G} \neg \mathcal{F}^*, \ \beta \lor \exists \mathsf{X} ((\gamma \land \neg v^*) \exists \mathsf{U} \ \beta) \vdash \neg v^*. \quad (\because \forall \mathsf{X} v_{\mathsf{t}/\forall \mathsf{x}} \subseteq v_{\mathsf{t}}, \beta \in v_{\mathsf{f}}, \text{ and Lemma 3})$$

$$\forall \mathsf{G} \neg \mathcal{F}^*, \ \gamma \exists \mathsf{U} \ \beta \vdash \neg v^*. \qquad (\because \text{Lemma 7})$$

This contradicts the consistency of $\langle \mathcal{F}, \mathcal{H}, \alpha \exists \mathsf{U} \beta, v \rangle$.

(2) Similarly to the proof of Lemma 30(4), we show

$$\forall \mathsf{G}\neg \mathcal{F}^*, \ \forall \mathsf{G}\neg v^*, \ \alpha \ \exists \mathsf{U} \ \beta, \ v_{\texttt{t}/\forall \texttt{x}}, \ \alpha \ \exists \mathsf{U} \ \beta \ \not\vdash \ \bot.$$

Assume otherwise, then we have the following derivation.

$$\begin{array}{ll} \forall \mathsf{G} \neg \mathcal{F}^*, \ \forall \mathsf{G} \neg v^*, \ v_{\mathsf{t}/\forall \mathsf{x}}, \ \alpha \exists \mathsf{U} \ \beta \ \vdash \ \bot. \\ \forall \mathsf{X} \forall \mathsf{G} \neg \mathcal{F}^*, \ \forall \mathsf{X} \forall \mathsf{G} \neg v^*, \ \forall \mathsf{X} v_{\mathsf{t}/\forall \mathsf{x}}, \ \exists \mathsf{X} (\alpha \exists \mathsf{U} \ \beta) \ \vdash \ \bot. \\ \forall \mathsf{X} \forall \mathsf{G} \neg \mathcal{F}^*, \ \forall \mathsf{X} \forall \mathsf{G} \neg v^*, \ \forall \mathsf{X} v_{\mathsf{t}/\forall \mathsf{x}}, \ \alpha \exists \mathsf{U} \ \beta \ \vdash \ \beta. \\ \forall \mathsf{X} \forall \mathsf{G} \neg \mathcal{F}^*, \ \forall \mathsf{X} \forall \mathsf{G} \neg v^*, \ \forall \mathsf{X} v_{\mathsf{t}/\forall \mathsf{x}}, \ \alpha \exists \mathsf{U} \ \beta \ \vdash \ \beta. \\ \forall \mathsf{X} \forall \mathsf{G} \neg \mathcal{F}^*, \ \forall \mathsf{X} \forall \mathsf{G} \neg v^*, \ \vdash \ \neg v^*. \\ (\because \ \forall \mathsf{X} v_{\mathsf{t}/\forall \mathsf{x}} \subseteq v_{\mathsf{t}}, \beta \in v_{\mathsf{f}}, \ \text{and} \ \text{Lemma 20(3)}) \end{array}$$

Here we reach the step (\dagger) of the proof of Lemma 30(3), and the remaining steps are same. QED

7 Proof of completeness

As is mentioned in the previous section, our counter-model \mathcal{M}_0 for φ_0 is $\langle \mathbb{C}(\mathbb{S}_0), \rightsquigarrow, V_0 \rangle$ where $\mathbb{C}(\mathbb{S}_0)$ and \rightsquigarrow are already defined. Here we define the mapping $V_0 : \mathbb{C}(\mathbb{S}_0) \times \operatorname{PropVar} \to \{t, f\}$ as follows.

$$V_0(\langle \mathcal{F}, \mathcal{H}, U, v \rangle, p) = \begin{cases} v(p) & (p \in \mathbb{S}_0) \\ \text{arbitrary} & (p \notin \mathbb{S}_0) \end{cases}$$

Lemma 32 (Main Lemma) The following hold for any formula φ in \mathbb{S}_0 and any cvaluation $\langle \mathcal{F}, \mathcal{H}, U, v \rangle$ in $\mathbb{C}(\mathbb{S}_0)$. (1) If $v(\varphi) = t$, then $\mathcal{M}_0, \langle \mathcal{F}, \mathcal{H}, U, v \rangle \models \varphi$. (2) If $v(\varphi) = f$, then $\mathcal{M}_0, \langle \mathcal{F}, \mathcal{H}, U, v \rangle \not\models \varphi$.

Proof By induction on φ using the Lemmas 33, 34, 37, 39, and 40 below. QED

Lemma 33 (Truth condition for \top, \neg, \wedge) Let $\langle \mathcal{F}, \mathcal{H}, U, v \rangle$ be a c-valuation in $\mathbb{C}(\mathbb{S}_0)$, and $\neg \psi$ and $\psi_1 \wedge \psi_2$ be formulas in \mathbb{S}_0 .

- (1) $v(\top) = t$.
- (2) If $v(\neg \psi) = t$, then $v(\psi) = f$.
- (3) If $v(\neg \psi) = f$, then $v(\psi) = t$.
- (4) If $v(\psi_1 \wedge \psi_2) = t$, then $v(\psi_1) = v(\psi_2) = t$.
- (5) If $v(\psi_1 \land \psi_2) = f$, then $v(\psi_1) = f$ or $v(\psi_2) = f$.

Proof (1) If $v(\top) = \mathbf{f}$, then the c-valuation $\langle \mathcal{F}, \mathcal{H}, U, v \rangle$ would be inconsistent because of the fact $\vdash \top$ and the definition of the consistency (Prop. 17). Proofs of (2)–(5) are similar using the facts $(\neg \psi, \psi \vdash \bot)$, $(\vdash (\neg \psi) \lor \psi)$, $(\psi_1 \land \psi_2 \vdash \psi_1)$, $(\psi_1 \land \psi_2 \vdash \psi_2)$, and $(\psi_1, \psi_2 \vdash \psi_1 \land \psi_2)$. **QED**

Lemma 34 (Truth condition for $\forall X$) Let $\langle \mathcal{F}, \mathcal{H}, U, v \rangle$ be a c-valuation in $\mathbb{C}(\mathbb{S}_0)$ and $\forall X \psi$ be a formula in \mathbb{S}_0 .

- (1) If $v(\forall X\psi) = t$, then $v'(\psi) = t$ for any c-valuation $\langle \mathcal{F}', \mathcal{H}', U', v' \rangle$ such that $\langle \mathcal{F}, \mathcal{H}, U, v \rangle \rightsquigarrow \langle \mathcal{F}', \mathcal{H}', U', v' \rangle$.
- (2) If $v(\forall X\psi) = f$, then there is a c-valuation $\langle \mathcal{F}', \mathcal{H}', U', v' \rangle$ such that $\langle \mathcal{F}, \mathcal{H}, U, v \rangle \rightsquigarrow \langle \mathcal{F}', \mathcal{H}', U', v' \rangle$ and $v'(\psi) = f$.

Proof By the definition of \rightsquigarrow and Lemma 30

Lemma 35 (Seriality) The relation \rightsquigarrow is serial; that is, for each c-valuation $\langle \mathcal{F}, \mathcal{H}, U, v \rangle$ in $\mathbb{C}(\mathbb{S}_0)$, there is a c-valuation $\langle \mathcal{F}', \mathcal{H}', U', v' \rangle$ such that $\langle \mathcal{F}, \mathcal{H}, U, v \rangle \rightsquigarrow \langle \mathcal{F}', \mathcal{H}', U', v' \rangle$.

QED

Proof We have $\forall X \neg \top \in \mathbb{S}_0$ (Lemma 23) and $v(\forall X \neg \top) = \mathbf{f}$ (\because otherwise $\langle \mathcal{F}, \mathcal{H}, U, v \rangle$ is inconsistent by the axiom D). Then Lemma 34(2) implies the existence of $\langle \mathcal{F}', \mathcal{H}', U', v' \rangle$. **QED**

Lemma 36 Suppose $\langle \mathcal{F}, \mathcal{H}, U, v \rangle \in \mathbb{C}(\mathbb{S}_0)$ and $\alpha \forall U \beta \in \mathbb{S}_0$. If $v(\alpha \forall U \beta) = \mathbf{f}$ and $v(\alpha) = \mathbf{t}$, then there is a c-valuation $\langle \mathcal{F}', \mathcal{H}', U', v' \rangle$ such that $\langle \mathcal{F}, \mathcal{H}, U, v \rangle \rightsquigarrow \langle \mathcal{F}', \mathcal{H}', U', v' \rangle$ and $v'(\alpha \forall U \beta) = v'(\beta) = \mathbf{f}$.

Proof By the definition of consistency and Lemmas 6(1), 6(5), and 34(2) (for $\psi = \alpha \forall U \beta$). Note that $\forall X(\alpha \forall U \beta) \in \mathbb{S}_0$ by Lemma 23. QED

Lemma 37 (Truth condition for $\forall U$) Let $\langle \mathcal{F}_0, \mathcal{H}_0, U_0, v_0 \rangle$ be a c-valuation in $\mathbb{C}(\mathbb{S}_0)$ and $\alpha \forall U \beta$ be a formula in \mathbb{S}_0 .

- (1) If $v_0(\alpha \forall \mathsf{U} \beta) = \mathsf{t}$, then for any infinite \rightsquigarrow -sequence $\langle \langle \mathcal{F}_i, \mathcal{H}_i, U_i, v_i \rangle_{(i=0,1,2...)} \rangle$ in $\mathbb{C}(\mathbb{S}_0)$ there is a number $k \geq 0$ such that $v_k(\beta) = \mathsf{t}$ and $(\forall i < k)(v_i(\alpha) = \mathsf{t})$.
- (2) If $v_0(\alpha \forall \mathsf{U} \beta) = \mathsf{f}$, then there is an infinite \rightsquigarrow -sequence $\langle \langle \mathcal{F}_i, \mathcal{H}_i, U_i, v_i \rangle_{(i=0,1,2...)} \rangle$ in $\mathbb{C}(\mathbb{S}_0)$ that satisfies $((v_k(\beta) = \mathsf{f}) \text{ or } (\exists i < k)(v_i(\alpha) = \mathsf{f}))$ for any $k \ge 0$.

Proof (1) Given $\langle \langle \mathcal{F}_i, \mathcal{H}_i, U_i, v_i \rangle_{(i=0,1,2...)} \rangle$, Lemmas 6(3) and 6(4), the definitions of consistency and \triangleright imply the fact:

$$(\forall i) \Big(\big(v_i(\alpha \,\forall \mathsf{U}\,\beta) = \mathsf{t} \text{ and } v_i(\beta) = \mathsf{f} \Big) \Rightarrow \\ \big(v_i(\alpha) = \mathsf{t}, \ v_i(\forall \mathsf{X}(\alpha \,\forall \mathsf{U}\,\beta)) = \mathsf{t}, \text{ and } v_{i+1}(\alpha \,\forall \mathsf{U}\,\beta) = \mathsf{t} \Big) \Big).$$

(Note that $\forall X(\alpha \forall \bigcup \beta) \in S_0$ by Lemma 23.) We have $v_0(\alpha \forall \bigcup \beta) = t$ by the premise, then the above fact implies either $(\forall i)(v_i(\alpha \forall \bigcup \beta) = t \text{ and } v_i(\beta) = f)$ or $(\exists k)(v_k(\beta) = t \text{ and } (\forall i < k)(v_i(\alpha) = t))$. We show that the former is impossible; this completes the proof of (1). Assume $(\forall i)(v_i(\alpha \forall \bigcup \beta) = t \text{ and } v_i(\beta) = f)$, then Lemma 28(1) and the definitions of "Next" and " \rightsquigarrow " imply that there exists a c-valuation $\langle \mathcal{F}_k, \mathcal{H}_k, U_k, v_k \rangle$ whose designated formula U_k is $\alpha \forall \bigcup \beta$. Because this c-valuation fails in the witness condition $(\because \text{ assumption})$, the next c-valuation $\langle \mathcal{F}_{k+1}, \mathcal{H}_{k+1}, U_{k+1}, v_{k+1} \rangle$ must be \diamondsuit or \clubsuit , and U_{k+1} is still $\alpha \forall \bigcup \beta$. Iterating this argument, we have $U_{k+x} = \alpha \forall \bigcup \beta$ for all x; this contradicts Lemma 28(1).

(2) We show how to define an infinite \rightsquigarrow -sequence $\langle \langle \mathcal{F}_i, \mathcal{H}_i, U_i, v_i \rangle_{(i=0,1,2...)} \rangle$ such that each c-valuation $\langle \mathcal{F}_i, \mathcal{H}_i, U_i, v_i \rangle$ satisfies at least one of the following conditions:

(I)
$$v_i(\alpha \forall \mathsf{U} \beta) = v_i(\beta) = \mathsf{f}.$$

(II)
$$(\exists j < i)(v_j(\alpha) = \mathbf{f}).$$

The first c-valuation $\langle \mathcal{F}_0, \mathcal{H}_0, U_0, v_0 \rangle$ satisfies the condition (I) because of $v_0(\alpha \forall \mathsf{U} \beta) = \mathsf{f}$ (premise), Lemma 6(1), and the definition of consistency. Suppose a sequence $\langle \mathcal{F}_0, \mathcal{H}_0, U_0, v_0 \rangle \rightsquigarrow \cdots \rightsquigarrow \langle \mathcal{F}_n, \mathcal{H}_n, U_n, v_n \rangle$ is already defined; then we define the next c-valuation $\langle \mathcal{F}_{n+1}, \mathcal{H}_{n+1}, U_{n+1}, v_{n+1} \rangle$ as follows: If $v_j(\alpha) = \mathsf{f}$ for some $j \leq n$, then the next node is an arbitrary c-valuation obtained by Lemma 35; otherwise, $\langle \mathcal{F}_n, \mathcal{H}_n, U_n, v_n \rangle$ satisfies the conditions " $v_n(\alpha) = \mathsf{t}$ " and (I), and the next node is obtained by Lemma 36. QED **Lemma 38** Let $\langle \mathcal{F}, \mathcal{H}, U, v \rangle$ be a c-valuation in $\mathbb{C}(\mathbb{S}_0)$ and $\alpha \exists U \beta$ be a formula in \mathbb{S}_0 .

- (1) If $v(\alpha \exists U \beta) = t$ and $v(\beta) = f$, then there is a c-valuation $\langle \mathcal{F}', \mathcal{H}', U', v' \rangle \in \mathbb{C}(\mathbb{S}_0)$ such that $\langle \mathcal{F}, \mathcal{H}, U, v \rangle \rightsquigarrow \langle \mathcal{F}', \mathcal{H}', U', v' \rangle$ and $v'(\alpha \exists U \beta) = t$.
- (2) If the designated formula U is $\alpha \exists U \beta$ and $v(\beta) = \mathbf{f}$, then there is a c-valuation $\langle \mathcal{F}', \mathcal{H}', \alpha \exists U \beta, v' \rangle \in \mathbb{C}(\mathbb{S}_0)$ such that $\langle \mathcal{F}, \mathcal{H}, \alpha \exists U \beta, v \rangle \rightsquigarrow \langle \mathcal{F}', \mathcal{H}', \alpha \exists U \beta, v' \rangle$ and $v'(\alpha \exists U \beta) = \mathbf{t}$.

Proof (1) $\forall X \neg (\alpha \exists U \beta) \in S_0$ by Lemma 23; then existence of the required c-valuation is guaranteed by the definition of consistency and Lemmas 6(4), 33(3), and 34(2). Note that $\exists X(\alpha \exists U \beta) = \neg \forall X \neg (\alpha \exists U \beta)$. (2) By Lemma 31. QED

Lemma 39 (Truth condition for $\exists U$) Let $\langle \mathcal{F}_0, \mathcal{H}_0, U_0, v_0 \rangle$ be a c-valuation in $\mathbb{C}(\mathbb{S}_0)$ and $\alpha \exists U \beta$ be a formula in \mathbb{S}_0 .

- (1) If $v_0(\alpha \exists U \beta) = t$, then there is an infinite \rightsquigarrow -sequence $\langle \langle \mathcal{F}_i, \mathcal{H}_i, U_i, v_i \rangle_{(i=0,1,2...)} \rangle$ in $\mathbb{C}(\mathbb{S}_0)$ that satisfies $v_k(\beta) = t$ and $(\forall i < k)(v_i(\alpha) = t)$ for some $k \ge 0$.
- (2) If $v_0(\alpha \exists U \beta) = \mathbf{f}$, then for any infinite \rightsquigarrow -sequence $\langle \langle \mathcal{F}_i, \mathcal{H}_i, U_i, v_i \rangle_{(i=0,1,2...)} \rangle$ in $\mathbb{C}(\mathbb{S}_0)$ and any $k \ge 0$, we have $v_k(\beta) = \mathbf{f}$ or $(\exists i < k)(v_i(\alpha) = \mathbf{f})$.

Proof (1) We define $\langle \langle \mathcal{F}_i, \mathcal{H}_i, U_i, v_i \rangle_{(i=0,1,2...)} \rangle$ consisting of three parts. The first part is $\langle \mathcal{F}_0, \mathcal{H}_0, U_0, v_0 \rangle \rightsquigarrow \langle \mathcal{F}_1, \mathcal{H}_1, U_1, v_1 \rangle \rightsquigarrow \cdots \rightsquigarrow \langle \mathcal{F}_a, \mathcal{H}_a, U_a, v_a \rangle$ where $(\forall i < a) (U_i \neq \alpha \exists U \beta, v_i(\alpha \exists U \beta) = t, and v_i(\beta) = f), v_a(\alpha \exists U \beta) = t and (U_a = \alpha \exists U \beta \text{ or } v_a(\beta) = t)$. This part is constructed from $\langle \mathcal{F}_0, \mathcal{H}_0, U_0, v_0 \rangle$ by iterated applications of Lemma 38(1). The existence of such a number *a* is guaranteed by Lemma 28(1) and the definition of "Next". The second part is $\langle \mathcal{F}_a, \mathcal{H}_a, U_a, v_a \rangle \rightsquigarrow \langle \mathcal{F}_{a+1}, \mathcal{H}_{a+1}, U_{a+1}, v_{a+1} \rangle \rightsquigarrow \cdots \rightsquigarrow \langle \mathcal{F}_k, \mathcal{H}_k, U_k, v_k \rangle$ where $(a \leq \forall i < k) (U_i = \alpha \exists U \beta, v_i(\alpha \exists U \beta) = t, and v_i(\beta) = f)$ and $v_k(\beta) = t$. This part is constructed from $\langle \mathcal{F}_a, \mathcal{H}_a, U_a, v_a \rangle$ by iterated applications of Lemma 38(2). The existence of such a number *k* is guaranteed by Lemma 28(1). The third part $\langle \mathcal{F}_k, \mathcal{H}_k, U_k, v_k \rangle \rightsquigarrow \langle \mathcal{F}_{k+1}, \mathcal{H}_{k+1}, U_{k+1}, v_{k+1} \rangle \rightsquigarrow \cdots$ is constructed by infinite iteration of Lemma 35. The condition $(\forall i < k)(v_i(\alpha) = t)$ is guaranteed by the definition of consistency, the fact $(\forall i < k)(v_i(\alpha \exists U \beta) = t \text{ and } v_i(\beta) = f)$, and Lemma 6(3).

(2) Given $\langle \langle \mathcal{F}_i, \mathcal{H}_i, U_i, v_i \rangle_{(i=0,1,2...)} \rangle$, Lemmas 6(1) and 6(5) and the definition of consistency imply the fact:

$$(\forall i) \Big(v_i(\alpha \exists \mathsf{U} \beta) = \mathsf{f} \Rightarrow \Big(v_i(\beta) = \mathsf{f} \text{ and } (v_i(\alpha) = \mathsf{f} \text{ or } v_i(\forall \mathsf{X} \neg (\alpha \exists \mathsf{U} \beta)) = \mathsf{t}) \Big) \Big).$$

(Note that $\forall \mathsf{X} \neg (\alpha \exists \mathsf{U} \beta) \in \mathbb{S}_0$ by Lemma 23 and that $\exists \mathsf{X}(\alpha \exists \mathsf{U} \beta) = \neg \forall \mathsf{X} \neg (\alpha \exists \mathsf{U} \beta)$.) We have $v_0(\alpha \exists \mathsf{U} \beta) = \mathbf{f}$ by the premise, hence the required condition $(\forall i)(v_i(\beta) = \mathbf{f} \text{ or } (\exists j < i)(v_i(\alpha) = \mathbf{f}))$ holds by the above fact and " $v_i(\forall \mathsf{X} \neg (\alpha \exists \mathsf{U} \beta)) = \mathbf{t} \Rightarrow v_{i+1}(\alpha \exists \mathsf{U} \beta) = \mathbf{f}$ " (: the definition of \triangleright and Lemma 33(2)).

QED

Lemma 40 (Truth condition for $\exists GF$) Let $\langle \mathcal{F}_0, \mathcal{H}_0, U_0, v_0 \rangle$ be a c-valuation in $\mathbb{C}(\mathbb{S}_0)$ and $\exists GF\psi$ be a formula in \mathbb{S}_0 .

- (1) If $v_0(\exists \mathsf{GF}\psi) = \mathsf{t}$, then there is an infinite \rightsquigarrow -sequence $\langle \langle \mathcal{F}_i, \mathcal{H}_i, U_i, v_i \rangle_{(i=0,1,2...)} \rangle$ in $\mathbb{C}(\mathbb{S}_0)$ such that $(\forall i)(\exists j \geq i)(v_j(\psi) = \mathsf{t})$.
- (2) If $v_0(\exists \mathsf{GF}\psi) = \mathbf{f}$, then for any infinite \rightsquigarrow -sequence $\langle \langle \mathcal{F}_i, \mathcal{H}_i, U_i, v_i \rangle_{(i=0,1,2...)} \rangle$ in $\mathbb{C}(\mathbb{S}_0)$ there is a number *i* such that $(\forall j \ge i)(v_j(\psi) = \mathbf{f})$.

Proof (1) The formula $\exists F(\psi \land \exists X \exists GF\psi)$, which is equal to $\top \exists U(\psi \land \neg \forall X \neg \exists GF\psi)$, is in \mathbb{S}_0 by Lemma 23. Hence the definition of consistency, the fact $v_0(\exists GF\psi) = t$ (premise), and Lemma 8(3) imply $v_0(\top \exists U(\psi \land \neg \forall X \neg \exists GF\psi)) = t$. We apply Lemma 39(1) and we get a finite sequence $\langle \mathcal{F}_0, \mathcal{H}_0, U_0, v_0 \rangle \rightsquigarrow \cdots \rightsquigarrow \langle \mathcal{F}', \mathcal{H}', U', v' \rangle$ (the "first and second parts" in the proof of Lemma 39(1)) such that $v'(\psi \land \neg \forall X \neg \exists GF\psi) = t$. Then Lemmas 33 and 34(2) imply that $v'(\psi) = t$ and that there is a c-valuation $\langle \mathcal{F}'', \mathcal{H}', U'', v'' \rangle$ such that $\langle \mathcal{F}', \mathcal{H}', U', v' \rangle \rightsquigarrow \langle \mathcal{F}'', \mathcal{H}'', U'', v'' \rangle$ and $v''(\exists GF\psi) = t$. Iterating this argument, we gat the required infinite sequence $\langle \langle \mathcal{F}_i, \mathcal{H}_i, U_i, v_i \rangle_{(i=0,1,2...)} \rangle$.

(2) Given $\langle \langle \mathcal{F}_i, \mathcal{H}_i, U_i, v_i \rangle_{(i=0,1,2...)} \rangle$, Lemmas 8(2) and 33 and the definitions of consistency and \triangleright imply the fact:

$$(\forall i) \Big(v_i (\exists \mathsf{GF}\psi) = \mathsf{f} \Rightarrow (v_i (\neg \forall \mathsf{X} \neg \exists \mathsf{GF}\psi) = \mathsf{f} \text{ and } v_{i+1} (\exists \mathsf{GF}\psi) = \mathsf{f}) \Big)$$

(Note that $\exists X \exists GF\psi$ is equal to $\neg \forall X \neg \exists GF\psi$ and is in \mathbb{S}_0 by Lemma 23.) This implies $(\forall i)(v_i(\exists GF\psi) = \mathbf{f})$ because of the premise $v_0(\exists GF\psi) = \mathbf{f}$. Then the existence of the required number *i* is guaranteed by Lemma 28(2). QED

Finally the main result of this paper is proved:

Theorem 41 (Completeness of H_{ECTL}) \mathcal{M}_0 is a finite model, and $\mathcal{M}_0, x \not\models \varphi_0$ for some state x. (φ_0 is a formula, fixed at the beginning of Section 6, such that $\not\vdash \varphi_0$, and \mathcal{M}_0 was defined at the beginning of this section.)

Proof Lemma 21 shows that there is a valuation v of \mathbb{S}_0 such that $v_t \not\vdash \bigvee v_f$ and $v(\varphi_0) = f$. Then put $x = \langle \emptyset, \emptyset, \top \forall \mathsf{U} \top, v \rangle$; x is consistent by the definition of consistency and Lemmas 6(2) and 23(1), and we have $\mathcal{M}_0, x \not\models \varphi_0$ by the Main Lemma 32(2). Finiteness and seriality of \mathcal{M}_0 is guaranteed by Lemmas 19 and 35. QED

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